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ABSTRACT

The field of conflict of laws suffers from a lack of theoretical coherence, and thereforefails to provide a satisfactory
basis for discourse, adjudication, legislation, and intergovernmental negotiation regarding issues of prescriptive
scope. This Article advances a law and economics-based
approachto conflict of lawsfor use in both the domestic and
internationalcontext. The Articlefirst assesses the theoretical
coherence of some principal conflict of laws approaches,
analyzing their resolution offour tensions: predictability and
adminstrability versus accuracy, unilateralism versus
multilateralism,private interest versus public interests, and
courts versus legislatures. It refers to Professor Baxter's
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"comparative impairment" methodology as well as prior law
and economic-based approaches to conflict of laws, and
articulates, extends, and modifies these approaches. This
Article proposes that decisionmakers faced with conflict of
laws issues should allocate prescriptivejurisdiction over a
subject matter to the government(s) whose constituents are
affected by the subject matter, pro rata in proportion to the
relative magnitude of such effects, as accurately as Is merited
given transaction costs in allocation of prescriptive
jurisdiction. This simple proposition, however, raises many
difficult theoreticalandpractical issues.
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It would be constructive ff legal scholars were to
give up the attempt to construct systems for choice of
law--an attempt that cannot- result In satisfactory
resolution of true conflicts of interest between states,
and that is very likely to result in the creation of
problems that do not otherwise exist....'
The classification of the constituents of a chaos,
2
nothing less here is essayed.
I. INTRODUCTION

Conflict of laws is a source of constant embarrassment to
lawyers, judges, and scholars. 3 Few can give advice, make
decisions, or analyze doctrine effectively. A survey of conflict of
laws doctrine reveals no rational or even generally accepted basis
for discourse, adjudication, legislation, or intergovernmental
negotiation regarding issues of prescriptive scope. 4
The

1.
BRAINERD CURRIE, SELECTED ESSAYS ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 121 (1963).
See Herma H. Kay, A Defense of Currle's Governmental InterestAnalysis, 215 (III)
RECUEIL DES COURTS D'ACADEMIE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL [R.C.A.D.I.l 150-51 (1989).

Currie's views are not unique. "[S]o many ... men, of great talents and learning,
are ... found to fail In fixing certain principles, we are forced to conclude that

they have failed, not from want of ability, but because the matter was not susceptible of being settled on certain principles." Saul v. His Creditors, 5 Mart. (n.s.)
569, 589 (1827). quoted In FRIEDRICH K. JUENGER, CHOICE OF LAW AND MULTISTATE
JUSTICE 45 (1993).

2.
HERMAN MELVILLE, MOBY DICK 134 (1851). See Glenn H. Reynolds, Chaos
and the Court, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 110 (1991) (showing the potential application of
chaos theory to legal decisions, to indicate that, while outcomes may appear
chaotic, they may comprise the outcome of a consistent theoretical framework).
3.
It Is widely agreed that Dean Prosser's oft-quoted and evocative 1953

description still rings true:
The realm of the conflict of laws is a dismal swamp, filled with quaking
quagmires, and inhabited by learned but eccentric professors who theorize
about mysterious matters in a strange and incomprehensible Jargon.
William L. Prosser, Interstate Publication, 51 MICH. L. REV. 959, 971 (1952-53).
Each eccentric professor who studies this topic believes he or she is contributing
to the effort to illuminate, ventilate, and cultivate the dismal swamp. However,
these well-intentioned efforts often merely add to the muck.
4.

Indeed there are a number of coexisting theories being applied,

depending on the forum, the type of matter, and the particular circumstances of
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indeterminacy of conflict of laws 5 has ramifications not just for
private decisions, in terms of predictability of applicable rules,
but also for public policy, in terms of effectiveness of substantive
policy. 6
An example may help to illustrate the problem. If a United
States manufacturer produces an automobile for a market in a
very poor, less-developed country, "Dystopia," with higher
hurdles to, and lower standards of, recovery in tort than the
United States, it may produce a less safe automobile and be able

the case. This Article will not argue that all cases should be subject to the same
conflicts rule; rather it will argue that the conflicts rule applicable should be
determined in a coherent manner. See Reynolds, supra note 2.
5.
For the origins of the term "conflict of laws", see ARTHUR T. VON MEHREN
& DONALD T. TRAUTMAN, THE LAW OF MULTISTATE PROBLEMS 3 n.1 (1965). The
authors noted that Professor Beale opted for 'Conflict of Laws' on a pragmatic
basis.
One can do no better, in explaining his choice of this title, than quote the
wise and witty words of Vareilles-Sommieres. [Footnotes omitted.] The
warlike expression 'Conflict of Laws' is used to describe the pacific work of
settling by fixed bounds the line of separation between two legislative
jurisdictions. The only conflict is among the legal authors who are doing
this work. Yet since the expression is consecrated by good use and Is
simple we may well make use of it.
Id. (quoting 1 JOSEPH H. BEALE, A TREATISE ON THE CONFLICT OF LAws 15 (1935)).
See also JUENGER, supranote 1. at 4-5.

In this Article, "conflict of laws" is used to refer to what is sometimes considered merely a branch of conflict of laws: choice of law. I will not be concerned
with other branches, such as choice of forum and enforcement of judgments,
although they are related and could be approached using a similar methodology.
See Harold G. Maier & Thomas R. McCoy, A Unifying Theory for Judicial
Jurisdictionand Choice of Law, 39 AM. J. COMP. L. 249 (1991); Spencer W. Waller,
A Unified Theory of InternationalProcedure,26 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 101 (1993). I use
the less accurate term "conflict of laws" instead of "choice of law" largely for
aesthetic reasons: "conflict of laws" connotes the kind of conceptual battle of
social policies that this Article seeks to evoke. Otherwise, I use "conflict of laws"
in its very broadest sense, encompassing both "private" law and "public" law. As
discussed below, this usage is not uncontroversial, and at least in some respects,

determines the course of this Article's analysis.
notes 75-77, 245-47.
6.

See Infra text accompanying

See, e.g., STEVEN SHAVELL, EcONOMIc ANALYSIS OF ACCIDENT LAW 79-83,

93-99 (1987); John Calfee & Richard Craswell, Deterrence and Uncertain Legal
Standards, 2 J.L. ECON. & ORGAN. 279, 299 (1986) ("Without knowing more than
we usually do about the actual probabilities of punishment created by a legal rule
and about the way those probabilities vary with a defendant's conduct, it is very
difficult to say what incentives that rule will create."); Jason S. Johnston.
Uncertainty, Chaos, and the Torts Process: An Economic Analysts of Legal Form, 76
CORNELL L. REv. 341 (1991) [hereinafter Uncertainty and Chaos]; Jason S.
Johnston, Bayesian Fact-Findingand Efficiency: Toward an Economic Theory of
Liability Under Uncertainty, 61 S. CAL. L. REv. 137 (1987).

980

VANDERBILT JOURNAL OFTRANSNATIONAL LAW

[Vol. 26:975

to sell it more cheaply. For instance, the manufacturer might
decide not to provide expensive passive restraints, such as air
bags or automatic seat belts. Assume that the United States
manufacturer's cars are just as safe as, if not safer than, those
produced in Dystopia by local manufacturers (and perhaps
imported to Dystopia by other foreign manufacturers) for the local
market. Assume further that the level of quality and hurdles to
successful litigation are adequate barriers against liability under

Dystopia law. Consumers in Dystopia might be happy to have
the United States manufacturer's cheaper and superior
automobiles. Dystopia's legislature has considered and rejected
the imposition of higher standards. However, if Dystopian consumers are injured by one of these automobiles, they may seek to
sue in the United States, with the hope that United States
procedure, regulatory requirements, strict liability, and standards
of recovery might be applicable. These people are perhaps
seeking the best of both worlds: low prices that fail to pass on
the cost of safety combined with a high level of manufacturer
responsibility for safety.7 Nevertheless, one might agree that as a
matter of substantive justice, the injured parties should win:
surely a life is worth as much-and should be protected as
much-regardless of whether it is that of a United States citizen
or an inhabitant of a less-developed state. However, one may feel
uncomfortable from the standpoint of the United States
manufacturer and the export competitiveness of United States
goods.

7.
See In re Union Carbide Corp. Gas Plant Disaster at Bhopal, India in
December, 1984, 634 F. Supp. 842 (S.D.N.Y. 1986). affd and modified, 809 F.2d
195 (2d Cir. 1987); R.R. Jesperson, The Bhopal Declsion: A Forum Non Conveniens
Perspective, 18 LINCOLN L. REV. 73 (1988); Ved P. Nanda, For Whom the Bell Tolls in

the Aftermath of the Bhopal Tragedy: Reflections on Forum Non Convenlens and
Alternative Methods of Resolving the Bhopal Dispute, 15 DENY. J. INT'L L. & PoLY'
235 (1987); Mark A. Chinen, Note, Jurisdiction: Foreign Plalntiffs, Forum Non
Convenlens, and Lltigation Against Multinational Corporations, 28 HARV. INT'L L.J.
202 (1987); Stephen J. Darmody, Note. An Economic Approach to Forum Non
Convenlens Dismissals Requested by U.S. Multinational Corporations-TheBhopal
Case, 22 GEo. WASH. J. INT'L L. & ECON. 215 (1988); Richard Schwadron, Note,
The Bhopal Incident. How Courts Have Faced Complex International Litigaton, 5
B.U. INT'L L.J. 445 (1987).
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These types of cases are often litigated and there is no clear
answer regarding whose law should govern: that of Dystopia or
that of the United States. 8 The public policy perspective of
Dystopia and the United States on these issues may differ, or
may be the same. Unpredictable conflict of laws rules result in
inaccurate allocation of social resources: over-investment by the
United States manufacturer in safety for products intended for
Dystopia's markets; or perhaps lack of choice for consumers in
Dystopia otherwise willing to accept a less-safe product, in the
event that the United States manufacturer declines 'to enter the
market.
This example illustrates the real problems of predictability,
accurate allocation of social resources, the concerns of
consumers arrayed against the concerns of government, and the
concerns of one government arrayed against the concerns of one
or more other governments. These are problems of trade, of efficiency, and of equity. They result from inadequate conflict of
laws rules.
At a time when conflict of laws issues like these arise more

frequently in tort cases,9 in securities law cases, 10 in antitrust

8.
See, e.g., Piper Aircraft v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235 (1981) (leaving intact the
decision of the Court of Appeals to apply United States law to injuries incurred in
Scotland); Challoner v. Day & Zimmermann, Inc., 512 F.2d 77, 80 (5th Cir. 1975),
vacated and remanded per curiam, 423 U.S. 3 (1975) (requiring application of
Texas choice of law in federal court, thus choosing Cambodian law to determine a
tort suit between a United States plaintiff and a United States manufacturer);
Harrison v. Wyeth Laboratories, 510 F. Supp. 1 (E.D. Pa. 1980). affd without
opinion, 676 F.2d 685 (3rd Cir. 1982). Often these types of cases are addressed
under aforum non conveniens analysis, and the court may not need to reach the
choice of law issue. See, e.g., Dow Chemical v. Castro Alfaro. 786 S.W. 2d 674
(Tex. 1990) (holding in case brought by Costa Ricans injured in Costa Rica by
United States product that Texas statute prohibits dismissal of a personal injury
or wrongful death claim on grounds offorum non convenens), cert. denied, 111 S.
Ct. 671 (1991). In response to the Alfaro case, the Texas legislature has amended
its statutory framework to allow the application offorum non convenlens to exclude
suits by foreign plaintiffs. See 61 U.S.L.W., Mar. 30, 1993, § 2.
9.
For examples, see the Alfaro case cited in note 8 and the Bhopal case
cited in note 7.
10. See, e.g., MCG, Inc. v. Great Western Energy Corp., 896 F.2d 170 (5th
Cir. 1990) (United States company, using a Hong Kong company to purchase
company shares of a United States company offered exclusively on London Stock
Exchange, denied recovery); Zoelsch v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 824 F.2d 27 (D.C.
Cir. 1987) (German plaintiffs purchasing securities of German partnership denied
recovery under United States law).
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cases,1 1 in tax, 12 and in labor law, 13 as well as in other areas,
and rational allocation of government authority over multistate or
transnational business has taken on greater importance, 1 4
conflict of laws theory could hardly be in greater disarray. That
disarray leaves many interstate and international problems unresolved or unsatisfactorily resolved. 15

11. See, e.g., Hartford Fire Insurance Co. v. California, 113 S.Ct. 2891 (1993)
(finding that the application of the United States antitrust laws is not subject to a
"comity" analysis in cases where there is not "in fact a true conflict between
domestic and foreign law"); Pfizer Inc. v. Government of India, 434 U.S. 308 (1978)
(recognizing foreign countries as "persons" entitled to recover treble damages
under @4 of the Clayton Act). Pfizer was legislatively reversed in 1982 under the
Foreign Sovereign Antitrust Recoveries Act, 15 U.S.C. § 15(b) (1988) (foreign
government acting in governmental, as opposed to commercial, capacity may only
recover actual damages). Professor Stephan has argued that Pfizer should have
incorporated a rule of reciprocity, and that allowing foreign governments to
recover "without extracting any return benefit, impaired the ability of the political

branches to develop common International norms of free competition." Paul B.
Stephan IIl, InternationalLaw in the Supreme Court, 1990 S. CT. REv. 133, 157
(1991). See Infra text accompanying notes 249-59.
12. Recently, the California Supreme Court ruled that California may use a
three-factor formula to apportion the income of a foreign multinational
corporation for state tax purposes, without violating the Commerce Clause of the
United States Constitution. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. Barclays Bank Int'l, Ltd.
v. Franchise Tax Board, 829 P. 2d 279 (Cal. .1992), cert. denied, 113 S.Ct. 202
(1992).
13. See E.E.O.C. v. Arabian American Oil Co., 111 S. Ct. 1227 (1991).
14. 1 join a long line of commentators in making this statement. See, e.g.,
William F. Baxter, Choice of Law and the Federal System, 16 STAN. L. REv. 1
(1963).
15. Again, many scholars have made this point, and few are satisfied with
the current state of affairs. See, e.g., Id. at 1 ("After attempting for several years to
teach the rules devised for the resolution of choice-of-law problems, I have
concluded that those rules do not yield satisfactory results"), and materials cited
in notes 1 and 3, supra.
The reader will note that I make little effort to
distinguish here between conflicts in the United States interstate system, and
conflicts in the international system. See Albert Ehrenzweig, Interstate and
InternationalConflicts Law: A Pleafor Segregation, 41 MINN. L. REv., 717 (1957);

Eugene F. Scoles, Interstate and InternationalDistinctions in Conflict of Laws In the

United States, 54 CAL. L. REv. 1599, 1599-1600 (1966) ("To apply mechanically a
rule developed in interstate cases to an international situation without a
consideration of its policy relevance is both wrong and dangerous"). These
arguments may be consistent with this Article's proposal, insofar as the proposal
also calls for appropriate responses to different institutional, constitutional, and
social settings. This is because I believe the differences are not relevant to my
analysis. Of course, in practice, these systems possess different constitutions and
different levels of consensus on various policies, as well as different levels of
desire for integration. However, the theoretical proposal advanced here is
applicable equally to interstate and international conflicts, although it may call for
different methodologies and outcomes in the two types of cases. We do not always
think of the international legal order as having a "constitution." See Leo Gross,
The Peace of Westphalia, 1648-1948, 42 Am.J. INT'L L. 20 (1948). With respect to
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Brainerd Currie, the central United States conflict of laws
scholar of this century, ceased his endeavor to find a resolution,
concluding that sometimes courts should leave conflicts of law
unresolved. 16 Of course, not to decide is to decide, and by virtue
of its presumably unprincipled outcome, this approach is likely to
be suboptimal. The first purpose of this Article is to begin to
sketch an optimal conflict of laws solution, based on law and
economics principles, that would provide a means of resolving
every conflicts issue. Although the optimal solution is not
feasible, it is possible to approximate more closely this optimal
solution. Thus, a second purpose of this Article is to analyze the
circumstances under which a retreat from the optimal solution is
necessary, arguing for as 'accurate and limited a retreat as
possible.

17

Even more important than the problem of adjudicating conflicts issues, and often disregarded by conflict of laws scholarship, is the problem of increased statutory and regulatory law
and increased bilateral, regional, plurilateral, 18 and multilateral
These statutes,
agreements in particular regulatory areas.
regulations, and international agreements provide the political
branches of government the opportunity to address conflicts
problems.' 9 Yet the formulation of these prescriptions is often

the internal United States perspective on the different constitutions and their
impact on conflicts approaches, see Daniel C. K. Chow, Limiting Erie In a New Age
of InternationalLaw: Toward a FederalCommon Law of InternationalChoice of Law.
74 IOWA L. REV. 165 (1988).
16. See CURRIE, supra note 1, at 602-03. It should be noted that while
Currie despaired of the possibilities that courts might develop conflicts systems
for addressing "real" conflicts, and was skeptical of Congress' willingness to act,
he nevertheless stated that "it is not unreasonable to call upon Congress, rather
than the courts, to resolve interstate conflicts in any critical situation." Id. at 603.
17. See Uncertainty and Chaos, supra note 6.
18. This term is used to denote agreements among multiple states that are
not located in the same region, when the number of states involved is smaller
than the number of states subscribing to GATT or the United Nations Charter.
which larger number is denoted by the term "multilateral."
19. With increasing frequency, it is becoming necessary to determine the
Jurisdictional reach of statutes. Congress has spoken to jurisdictional reach only
in limited instances. Even when Congress has addressed this issue, it has often
failed to do so with great clarity. For example, § 7 of the Sherman Act, added by
the Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvements Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 6a, 45(a)(3) (1988),
provides an exemption from the Sherman Act for export commerce that does not
have a direct, substantial, and reasonably foreseeable effect on United States
markets (domestic trade, import trade, or export trade). See Hartford Fire
Insurance Co. v. California, 113 S.Ct. 2891, 2908 (1993) (finding that the scope of
this exemption was unclear in its application to the relevant conduct). For a
discussion of the scope of this exemption, see Spencer W. Waller, The Ambivalence
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negotiated or formulated without
sufficient concern for, or
20
analysis of, conflicts problems.
A. The Proposal
This Article thus proposes a principle for discourse,
adjudication, legislation, and intergovernmental negotiation
regarding conflict of laws. 2 1 Prior to the development of the dis-

of United States Antitrust Policy Towards Single-Country Export Cartels, 10 Nw. J.
INT'L L. & BUS. 98 (1989-90). In addition, in 1979, Congress amended the Export

Administration Act to widen the potential scope of prescriptive jurisdiction.
Export Administration Act of 1979, 50 U.S.C. app. § 2404(a) (1988) (extending
Jurisdiction to goods or technology or any person "subject to the jurisdiction of the
United States"). These amendments left open the question of what goods,
technology, or persons were in fact subject to the jurisdiction of the United States,
and the Commerce Department's 1981 regulations in connection with the
imposition of martial law in Poland interpreted the coverage very widely. See 47
Fed. Reg. 27,250 (1982), revoked, 47 Fed. Reg. 51,858 (1982). In response to the
Supreme Court's decision in the Boureslan case, E.E.O.C. v. Arabian American Oil
Co., 111 S. Ct. 1227 (1991), Congress has amended Title VII of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964 to specify its extraterritorial application. Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L.
No. 102-166, § 109, 105 Stat. 1071 (1991). In the field of securities regulation,
the Securities and Exchange Commission has taken action to divide the world for
regulatory purposes in connection with its principal areas of regulation, including
public offerings, broker-dealer regulation, and tender offers. See, e.g., Regulation
S-Rules Governing Offers and Sales Made Outside the United States Without
Registration Under the Securities Act of 1933, 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.901-904 (1991).
See Joel P. Trachtman, Recent Initiatives In InternationalFinancialRegulation and
Goals of Competitiveness, Effectiveness, Consistency and Cooperation, 12 Nw. J.
INT'L L. & Bus. 241 (1991) [hereinafter Recent Initiatives].
20. For examples of inconsistencies and difficulties of unilateral, bilateral,
and regional approaches to allocation of prescriptive authority in international
finance regulation, see Recent Initiatives, supra note 19. On the other hand, the
European Community, in its use of the technique of "essential harmonization,"
has often legislated well-consldered conflict of laws rules for public law. See, e.g.,
Second Council Directive of December 15, 1989 on the Coordination of Laws,
Regulations and Administrative Provisions Relating to the Taking Up and Pursuit of
the Business of Credit Institutions and Amending Directive ,77/780 art. 32, 1989
O.J. (L 386) 1. This new legislative technique, the so-called "new approach" to
harmonization, involves legislation of minimal (or "essential") harmony in a
particular area of regulation, combined with mutual recognition by each Member
State of each other Member State's regulation. See, e.g., Jacques Pelkmans, The
New Approach to Technical Harmonizationand Standardization,25 J. COMMON MaT.
STU.
251 (1987); Council Resolution on a New Approach to Technical
Harmonization, 1985 O.J. (C 136) 1. Mutual recognition of home state regulation
is a conflict of laws rule that allocates prescriptive jurisdiction (at least with
respect to specified matters) to the home state, as defined.
21. It has been thirty years since Professor Baxter observed that "the

deficiencies of present choice-of-law rules are attributable in large part to a lack of
foundation on intelligible normative criteria." Baxter, supra note 14, at 1. Since
then, matters have not improved and may have become worse.
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cipline of law and economics, courts and scholars lacked the
complete vocabulary and theoretical resources necessary to
address coherently true conflicts problems, with the result being
that conflict of laws theory has remained incoherent. 22 This
Article posits that law and economics can provide the tools of
measurement necessary to guide (but in most cases not to
predetermine the outcome of) discourse, adjudication, legislation,
and negotiation in conflict of laws, and thereby to lend it
23
coherence.
Another factor that has hampered the development of conflict
of laws is the failure to conceive of conflict of laws as relating to
public law. Conflict of laws has its origins in private law2 4 and
thus is unprepared to recognize that "private law" is an
oxymoron. The proposal of this Article is premised on the
principle that all conflict of laws rules allocate power to government.25 The next basis for this proposal is the proposition that it
is beneficial to allocate power consistently with responsibility: to
22. Professor Baxter approached these issues using law and economics
concepts in 1963. Id.
23. However, this Article suggests modifications in the approach taken so far
by some law and economics scholars to conflict of laws. As noted by Judge
Posner, law and economics methodology has not been applied vigorously to the
conflict of laws problem. RICHARD A. POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS: CRISIS AND
REFORM 307 (1985) [hereinafter THE FEDERAL COURTS].
See also RICHARD A.
POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 587-88 (4th ed. 1992) [hereinafter ECONOMIC
ANALYSIS]; Richard A. Posner, The Constitution as an Economic Document, 56 GEO.
WASH. L. REv. 4 (1987); Richard A. Posner, The Decline of Law as an Autonomous

Discipline: 1962-1987, 100 HARv. L. REV. 761 (1987): Michael E. Solimine, An
Economic and EmpiricalAnalysis of Choice ofLaw, 24 GA. L. REv. 49 (1989).
24. See Infra note 75. See also Friedrich K. Juenger, A Page of History, 35
MERCER L. REv. 419 (1984); Rodolfo De Nova, Historical and Comparative
Introduction to Conflictof Laws, 118 (II) R.C.A.D.I. 435 (1966).
25. This proposition is not new, although it is not universally accepted.
Baxter said of Currie: "[als his own analysis effectively shows, the process of
resolving choice cases is necessarily one of allocating spheres of legal control
among states." Baxter, supra note 14, at 22. It is a corollary of the proposition,
expressed by Lenin, that all law is public law. JOHN N. HAZARD, COMMUNISTS AND
THEIR LAW 77 (1975).
See John H. Merryman, The Public Law-Private Law
DistinctionIn EuropeanandAmerican Law, 17 J. PUB. L. 3. 13 (1968). If all law is
public law, then all law is an expression of state power. Conflict of laws is thus
the science of circumscription of state power. For a criticism of Currie's failure to
distinguish private from public law, see Gerhard Kegel, FundamentalApproaches,
§§ 3-11, In III ENCYCLOPEDIA OF COMPARATIVE LAw 3-19 (Kurt Lipstein ed., 1987)
(arguing that the assimilation of "private matters" to matters of state "might be
suitable for a totalitarian state."). See also Friedrich K. Juenger, Governmental
Interests-Real and Spurious--In Multistate Disputes, 21 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 515
(1988). Perhaps with Currie, I see the protection of private interests as subordinate to the allocation of governmental power. See Infra text accompanying
notes 74-77. 245-47.
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ensure that all costs of action are internalized by the individuals
or

societies

allocated

the

power

to

decide

and

act.2 6

Responsibility is derived from effects on constituents: a government absorbs responsibility, or must take responsibility, to the
extent that its constituents are affected. 2 7 Therefore, power
should be allocated in accordance with effects. 28 The effects test
asserted by the United States (and others) in extraterritoriality
discourse 2 9 should be0 refined and adapted as a foundation for all
3
conflict of laws rules.

26. See
Joel
P. Trachtman,
International Regulatory Competition,
Externalization, and Jurisdiction,34 HARV. INT'L L.J. 47 (1993). for a discussion of
the effect of possibilities for externalization on the utility of regulatory
competition.
See also Michael W. McConnell, A ChoIce-of-Law Approach to
Products-Liability Reform, In NEW DIRECTIONS IN LIABILITY LAW 90 (W. Olson ed.,
1988); Bruce L. Hay, Conflicts of Law and State Competition in the Product Liability
System, 80 GEo. L.J. 617 (1992). Coase argues that in a zero transaction cost
world, internalization is unnecessary and externalities unworrisome. RONALD H.
COASE, THE FIRM, THE MARKET, AND THE LAW 10-16 (1987). However, Coase posited
this model in order to help understand a world with transaction costs. I will argue
below that in a world with transaction costs, it is more efficient as an initial state
to internalize externalities. See Infra text accompanying notes 288-304.
27. The author makes some unwarranted assumptions regarding the
responsiveness of government. The public choice literature shows that government does not accurately reflect the preferences of citizens. See, e.g.. KENNETH J.
ARRow, SOCIAL CHOICE AND INDIVIDUAL VALUES 59-60 (1951); Daniel A. Farber &
Philip P. Frickey, The Jurisprudenceof Public Choice, 65 TEX. L. REV. 873 (1987).

28. See Gregory S. Alexander, The Concept of Function and the Basts of
Regulatory Interests Under Functional Choice-of-Law Theory: The Significance of
Benefit and the Insignificance of Intention, 65 VA. L. REV. 1063 (1979). Professor
Alexander examines effects as a basis for allocation of power. "Rational allocation
requires an assessment of the effect upon a state of denying the authority to
regulate a dispute. If such denial would affect a state adversely, that state may be
considered legitimately interested." Id. at 1064. Professor Alexander argues
accordingly that effects, rather than interests, should be the basis for interest
analysis. Id. at 1090. See also Baxter, supra note 14.
29. There is a vast literature on extraterritoriality. A fine recent summary
and analysis is provided by Gary B. Born, A Reappraisal of the Extraterritorlal
Reach of U.S. Law, 24 LAw & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 1 (1992).
30. To those who follow the problem of extraterritoriality, this is a radical
assertion and endorsement of a basis for jurisdiction promoted by the United
States, but viewed with distaste (albeit sometimes adopted) in other states.
United States assertion of prescriptive jurisdiction on the basis of territorial effects
is often criticized by other governments or by commentators as "extraterritorial" or
as excessive. See, e.g., HOMER E. MOYER, JR. & LINDA MABRY, EXPORT CONTROLS As
INSTRUMENTS OF FOREIGN POLICY 169 app. 8, 9. 10, 11 (1985) (diplomatic objections
to United States extraterritorial export controls). See Cuban Democracy Act of
1992, 22 U.S.C.A. § 6001, 6005 (West Supp. 1993) (prohibiting "certain transactions between certain United States firms and Cuba" and sanctioning vessels
that have entered Cuban ports to engage in trade). But see Russell L. Weintraub,
The ExtraterritorialApplication of Antitrust & Securities Laws: An Inquiry Into the
Utility of a "Choice-of-Law"A
pproach, 70 TEx. L. REv. 1799 (1992). for an argument
that the effects test is inappropriate for conflict of laws generally.
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This Article proposes that decisionmakers faced with conflict
of laws issues should allocate prescriptive jurisdiction over a
subject matter to the government(s) whose constituents are
affected by the subject matter, pro rata in proportion to the
relative magnitude of such effects, as accurately as is merited
31
given transaction costs in allocation of prescriptive jurisdiction.
This simple proposition raises many difficult theoretical and
The most difficult theoretical problem is
practical issues.

whether the determination of effects is relative, that is, whether
effects may only be determined once the state's policy is determined.3 2 The most difficult practical problem is measuring
effects. Another practical problem is establishing a tradeoff
between accuracy in allocation of jurisdiction on the one hand,
and predictability and administrability on the other. Given that
the smallest phenomenon has enormously wide potential effects,3 3 how can prescriptive jurisdiction be broken down into
administrable and meaningful pieces?
One no longer can blindly accept the inaccuracy of trying to
allocate prescriptive jurisdiction over a particular matter to a
single government,3 4 despite significant direct effects on another
society, or even widely dispersed and indirect effects on many
other societies. 3 5 It is necessary to reaffirm and embrace the
31. See Infra text accompanying notes 280-328. This statement is similar to,
but distinct from, Baxter's comparative impairment approach (see supra text
accompanying note 14), and the approach suggested by Professor Alexander.
Alexander, supra note 28, at 1080 ("Choice-of-law theory therefore must recognize
a basis for allocating regulatory authority to a state whenever that allocation
would further the state's goals or achieve some beneficial social effect that is
consistent with the state's conception of public welfare.").
32. In this respect, this proposal is related to Professor Baxter's: "The extent
to which the purpose underlying a rule will be furthered by application or
impaired by nonapplication to cases of a particular category may be regarded as
the measure of the rule's pertinence and of the state's interest in the rule's
application to cases within the category." Baxter, supra note 14, at 9. See Infra
text accompanying notes 169-94.
33. See, e.g., JAMES GLEICK, CHAOS: MAKING A NEw SCIENCE 8. 11-31 (1988)
(describing the "Butterfly Effect": the "notion that a butterfly stirring the air today
in Peking can transform storm systems next month in New York."). See also
Reynolds, supranote 2.
34. Thus, this Article argues for a precise, rather than a gross. approach to
jurisdiction, at least as an initial analytical position. The gross approach may be
appropriate as a fallback position to reduce complexity and administrative costs.

It is interesting that conflicts scholars, especially interest analysts, have often
thought in continuous adjustment terms but have formulated recommendations
in discrete adjustment terms. See, e.g., Baxter, supranote 14.
35. See the recent discussion of the effects test in Hartford Fire Insurance
Co. v. California, 113 S.Ct. 2891 (1993). In his majority opinion, Justice Souter
noted that "it is well established by now that the Sherman Act applies to foreign
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complex and essentially political nature of conflict of laws
problems. 3 6
From a political standpoint, the proposal of this Article may
be restated as follows: Prescriptive jurisdiction may only be
legitimated by, and to the extent of, concern regarding effects on
the community purporting to prescribe. This is consistent with
social contract theory3 7 and with subsidiarity.3 8 Subsidiarity is
the vertical form of the proposal. The proposal allocates control
horizontally to those affected, thereby placing the government in

a horizontal order to which to allocate power. 3 9

Subsidiarity

allocates control vertically to those affected, thereby placing the
government in a vertical order to which power should be
allocated. 40 To the extent that subsidiarity indicates a move upward in the vertical level at which a particular matter is

conduct that was meant to produce and did in fact produce some substantial
effect in the United States." Id. at 2909. Justice Souter also applies § 7 of the
Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 6a, 45(a)(3) (1988). Id.
36. It Is Important to recognize that scholars cannot turn their backs on this
complexity: They must recognize that when they simplify in the name of
administrability, they act inconsistently with optimal allocation of responsibility to
governments. They may be willing, however, to accept a sub-optimal allocation in
exchange for a reduction of administration costs. Politics is the free market in
Ideas and negotiation that are used to integrate varying individual views into a
more-or-less coherent social policy. It is thus the best tool for handling this type
of complexity.
37. Social contract theory holds that the power of the state is determined
dynamically by the purposes for which the state is formed. JEAN-JACQUES
ROUSSEAU, CONTRAT SOCIAL [SOCIAL CONTRACT] (1762). See, e.g., JAMES BUCHANAN,
FREEDOM IN CONSTITUTIONAL CONTRACT (1977). Of course, conflict of laws presents
a special problem for social contract theory: who are the parties to the contract,
and for what purposes? The answer to this question lies in the determination of
who are the social actors that are being discussed. It may not seem fair to subject
a French Individual to a law produced by the United States social contract, as the
French individual has no social contract with United States citizens. However, in
the "society of nations," one might posit that France has a social contract with the
United States, which may allow the United States to subject French citizens to
United States laws in appropriate circumstances, and on a reciprocal basis.
38. See Deborah Z. Cass, The Word That Saves Maastrlcht? The Principle of
Subsidlarilty and the Division of Powers Within the European CommunIty, 29
COMMON MKT. L. REv. 1107 (1992); A. G. Toth, The Principleof Subsidlarilty In the

MaastrlchtTreaty, 29 COMMON MKr. L. REv. 1079 (1992); Joel P. Trachtman, L'Etat,
C'est Nous: Sovereignty, Economic Integration and Subsidlarilty, 33 HARV. INT'L L.J.
459 (1992).
39. In this sense, conflict of laws amounts to nothing less than the horizontal component of a constitution: defining among horizontally-related societies
the scope of the power of each. The horizontal component of a federal constitution
must be related to the vertical component. See Trachtman, supranote 26.
40. Id. Subsidiarity argues that authority should be allocated along the
vertical axis to the level at which a given social policy may be effected most
efficiently.
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regulated, through either harmonization of law or centralization
of law, the horizontal problem of conflict of laws is eliminated.
Conflict of laws is thus a means of organizing valid horizontal
diversity.
Currie despaired of finding any solution; he argued in his
earlier work for the simple application of forum law as the best
approach to "true conflicts"-conflicts of two societies' applicable
policies-placing administrability above accuracy. 4 1 In his later
work, Currie moderated this approach by allowing that the forum
state might moderate its policy or interest and thereby defer to
another state's law.42 Thus, he linked unilateralism, expression
of the forum state's interests, with multilateralism, regard for the
concerns of other jurisdictions.
Subsequent scholars have
described or recommended eclectic approaches, 43 in some cases
44
combining unilateral approaches with multilateral approaches.
In addition to seeking to combine unilateral and multilateral approaches (which may merge in certain circumstances), scholars
have sought to marry conflicts justice45 with substantive

41. This was Currie's self-styled "give-it-up" philosophy. See CuRRiE, supra
note 1, at 120-21. Curie argued that "[a] give-it-up attitude is constructive when
it appears that the task is impossible of accomplishment with the resources that
are available." Id. at 121. For a comprehensive and nuanced analysis and

defense of Currie's scholarship, see Kay, supra note 1, at 152. It is worth noting
that Professor Singer reports that courts appear to have uniformly avoided explicit
adoption of this principle of applying forum law to real conflicts. Joseph W.
singer, FacingReal Conflicts, 24 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 197. 200 n.12 (1991). Singer
proposes adoption of this principle in the form of a presumption. However, Singer
posits exceptions to this principle for "Justified expectations" and for
circumstances where application of forum law would regulate relationships
"centered" in another state, and would thereby interfere with Its nature as a
community. Id. at 203. These exceptions loom enormous.
42. Brainerd Currie, The DisinterestedThird State, 28 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS.
754, 763 (1963). See also Kay, supranote 1, at 68-77.
43. See James E. Westbrook, A Survey and Evaluation of Competing Choiceof-Law Methodologies: The Case for Eclecticism, 40 Mo. L. REv. 407 (1975). But
see William A. Reppy, Eclecticism in Choice of Law: Hybrid Method or Mishmash?,
34 MERCER L. REV. 645 (1983) (criticizing eclecticism as lacking in certainty and
administrability).
44. See, e.g., VON MEHREN & TRAUTMAN, supranote 5, at 76-79.
45. Conflicts justice may simply be defined as the application of the correct
law as indicated by nonsubstantive conflict of laws analysis, regardless of the
quality of the law. See JUENGER, supra note 1. at 69-70 (referring to Kegel for this
"peculiar brand of justice that Is readily satisfied by the application of the law
most closely connected with a particular transaction").
I argue below that
"conflicts justice" may be analogized to allocational efficiency at the state level,
whereas substantive Justice may be analogized to allocational efficiency at the firm
or private level. Conflicts justice and substantive justice may coincide, but may
diverge. See Infra text accompanying notes 239-62.

990

VANDERBILT JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW

Justice. 4 6

[Vol. 26:975

This Article seeks to explain the inconsistencies of

these approaches as, in many respects, appropriate and con-

sistent in a larger context, just as a toolbox containing a variety
of tools, each appropriate to a particular circumstance, is consis-

tent. Different approaches to conflicts problems, by different
decisionmaking bodies, will be appropriate to different circumstances, depending on a variety of factors.

The best solution to conflict of laws problems is negotiation
and agreement of conflicts rules among governments.

This

negotiation should be informed by the methodology described
here.47
Unfortunately, this solution will often be politically
unacceptable, and more importantly, is often impracticable. A
second-best solution might involve implementation of the

46.

Kegel has argued that this marriage is impossible:

"Both are entirely

different things: it is one thing to try and find rules which correctly balance
opposing Interests in material and spiritual values; It is another to look at the
globe, to see many states with different laws and to ask oneself which state's rule
to apply." Gerhard Kegel, PaternalHome and Dream Home: Traditional Conflict of
Laws and the American Reformers, 27 Am. J. COMP. L. 615, 621 (1979).
47. Currie put it this way:
I can only repeat that no satisfactory solution can possibly be evolved
by means of the resources of conflict-of-laws law. This does not mean that
the problem cannot be solved. It cannot be solved by any effort, judicial or
legislative, however brilliant in its conception, on the part of a single state
acting alone; and conflict of laws law, strictly speaking, is found only in the
laws of individual states ....
It is possible, however, that the conflict may
be resolved by agreement between the states concerned, and it is clear
that it can be resolved by higher governmental authority.
CURRIE, supra note 1, at 117.

See also LEA BRILMAYER, CONFLICT OF LAWs:

FOUNDATIONS AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS 143-189 (1991) [hereinafter FOUNDATIONS];
Michael H. Gottesman, Drainingthe Dismal Swamp: The Casefor Federal Choice of
Law Statutes, 80 Gao. L.J. 1, 21 (1991) (arguing that the correct forum for this
negotiation is Congress). My statement that intergovernmental negotiations
should be informed by the proposal made here is more than a conceit. It is hoped
that by establishing a normative basis for negotiations, and providing a guide to
establishing valuations of the issues being negotiated. negotiations can be
facilitated, reducing transaction costs and thereby allowing efficient allocation of
prescriptive jurisdiction. Principles can add much to a negotiation, especially if
they are agreed.

(1981).

See, e.g., ROGER FISHER & WILLIAM URY, GETTING To YES 84-98
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methodology described here unilaterally" by state legislatures. 4 9
Even this may often prove impracticable, however, and it raises
serious issues of impartiality. In the end, when intergovernmental agreement fails and legislatures fail to act unilaterally,
these problems fall to the courts, which must act unilaterally,
although they may have regard to reciprocity or comity as quasiunilateral strategies. When faced with these problems, courts
may refuse to embrace the complexity of the problem and simply
apply forum law or defer to foreign law.5" Alternatively, courts
may embrace complexity and seek to "negotiate with themselves"
in accordance with the methodology described
a resolution
1
here.5
B. The Argument
The remainder of the Article is organized as follows. Part II
analyzes three significant and representative approaches to
conflict of laws: 5 2 (1) Beale's vested rights theory; (2) Currie's

48. By "unilaterally", I mean simply that the decision is made without
negotiating with other jurisdictions, and is not necessarily referring to the
unilateralist tradition in conflict of laws, which would require courts to consider
conflicts questions solely from the standpoint of forum policy, determining the
scope of application of forum law. This tradition is often distinguished from the
multilateral tradition, which approaches conflicts as a choice among competing
jurisdictions. See JUENGER, supra note 1. at 13-14.
49. There are significant criticisms of the ability of legislatures to resolve
conflict of laws problems. See, e.g., Donald Trautman, Reflections on Confllct-ofLaws Methodology, 32 HASTINGS L.J. 1612, 1620 (1981) ("I believe legislative
direction is inherently incapable of capturing the nuance and sophistication
necessary for just and satisfactory choice-of-law solutions.").
50. Sometimes courts manage to throw the case out of court altogether, for
example under the principle of forum non convenlens. Indeed, Currie encouraged
such action: "the best way for the courts to handle the case of the disinterested

third state is, first, to dismiss on forum non conventens grounds where that is an
appropriate disposition." CuRRm, supra note 1, at 607. Often an underlying
concern of forum non convenlens doctrine is uncertainty of the governing law, or
discomfort with the task of applying foreign law. See In re Union Carbide Corp.
Gas Plant Disaster at Bhopal, India in December, 1984, 634 F. Supp. 842
(S.D.N.Y. 1986), affd and modfled, 809 F.2d 195 (2d Cir. 1987). See also
materials cited in notes 7 and 8. supra; Maier & McCoy, supra note 5; Allen R.
Stein, Forum Non Convenlens and the Redundancy of CourtAccess Doctrine, 133 U.
PA. L. REV.781 (1985).
51. One option courts do not generally have, and one source of the comparative disadvantage of courts in this area, is the ability of the political branches
of government to negotiate with foreign governments regarding which society's
rules should govern a particular matter.
52. I have by necessity left out several significant approaches, including von
Mehren and Trautman's functionalism, VON MEHREN & TRAUTMAN, supra note 5;

992

VANDERBILT JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW

[Vol. 26:975

interest analysis; and (3) Leflar's choice influencing considerations and better law factor.5 3 This analysis indicates that each of
the conflict of laws theories examined may be viewed as an
attempt, in an imperfect world, to approximate, albeit inaccurately, the solution provided by this Article's proposal. In this
sense, these theories, although flawed themselves, provide a sort
of inductive support for the proposal.54 The proposal, however,
rests more strongly on a deductive analysis.
Part III analyzes the two major antecedents of the proposal:
(1) Baxter's comparative impairment approach and (2) early law
and economics work on conflict of laws.
Part IV builds on Parts II and III to provide a more detailed
deductive articulation of this Article's proposal, to explain some
complexities, and to seek to address some potential criticisms
implicated by the proposal. In this discussion, the private and
public distinction in conflict of laws is addressed and then related
to the unilateral and multilateral distinction.5 5 Part IV addresses
the problem of accuracy in conflict of laws, relating it to the
definition of "effects," which in turn is related to the definition of

Savigny's seat test, FRIEDRICH C.V. SAVIGNY, A TREATISE ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS,
AND THE LIMITS OF THEIR OPERATION IN RESPECT OF PLACE AND TIME 42-46 (1869), and
the Restatement Second's most significant connection test, RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF CONFLICT OF LAWS (1971) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT SECOND]. However, the

approaches described are sufficient to make my points.
53. Rather than try to repeat what others have done well, I have tried to
provide an account that is harnessed to my purpose. For this reason, I have left
out important aspects of these theories. However, I do not believe the omitted
aspects are material to my purpose.
54. This support could be based, in part, on the presumed efficiency of the
common law: (I) the common law is efficient; (ii) the common law has increasingly
approximated the outcomes of the proposal; therefore, (ill) the proposal is efficient.
There is a voluminous literature arguing the issue of the relative efficiency of the
common law, and Its implications. See, e.g., WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A.
POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF TORT LAW (1987); Richard A. Posner, The
Ethical and PoliticalBasis of the Efficiency Norm in Common Law Adjudication, 8
HOFSTRA L. REv. 487 (1980). Similar inductive support might also be based on the
fact that legislative and treaty law, as well as adjudication, frequently arrive at
similar conclusions to those indicated by the proposal.
55. This is the unilateralist/multilaterallst distinction described supra at
note 48. See also, e.g., FOUNDATIONS, supra note 47, at 1:
Is the choice between two states' laws an external and objective one.
based on methods or rules that are in some measure independent of the
preferences of the particular alternative states whose laws might be
chosen? .

.

. Or is the perspective the internal perspective of one of the

alternative states, namely the one that is now charged with deciding the
case?
(emphasis in original), quoted in Harold G. Maier, Baseball and Chicken Salad:- A
Realistic Look at Choice of Law, 44 VAND. L. REv. 827, 830 (1991).
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state policy. Of course, the very definition of policy itself is
troublesome, as one must be careful to encompass the full scope
of public policy, including the varying local policies that may be
56
expressed in a single prescription, the "multistate policies" that
are of increasing importance, as well as the policies of
predictability and administrability. 5 7 In order to provide a point
of departure for the approach to effects, which amounts to an
arguably normative basis for conflicts analysis, Professor
Brilmayer's rights-based method of arriving at normative
foundations of conflict of laws is examined. 5 8
Finally, Part V, discusses some policy implications of the proposal, and includes some concluding observations. The Article
seeks to describe how its proposal may be applied in discourse,
adjudication, legislation, and intergovernmental negotiation.
II. THE PROBLEM WITH CONFLICT OF LAWS
Ever since Currie, Cook, and Cavers discredited Beale's
"vested rights" theory, 5 9 no successor theory has met with
widespread acceptance. 6 0 This part of the Article, provides brief

56. See VON MEHREN & TRAUTMAN, supranote 5, at 215-326 (1965).
57. Administrability has been the focus of some law and economics literature
on conflict of laws. See, e.g., ECONOMIc ANALYSIS, supra note 23, at 587: THE
FEDERAL COURTS, supra note 23, at 305-06. See also, Duncan Kennedy, Form and
Substance In Private Law Adjudication. 89 HARv. L. REv. 1685 (1976) (describing
von Ihering's concept of formal realizability, similar to administrability. as one of
the central touchstones of argument in private law adjudication).
58. FOUNDATIONS, supra note 47; see also Lea Brilmayer, Rights, Fairnessand
Choice of Law, 98 YALE L.J. 1277 (1989); Lea Brilmayer, JurisdictionalDue Process
and PoliticalTheory, 39 U. FLA. L. REv. 293 (1987).
59. See Infra note 105. The vested rights theory was articulated in the
Restatement First of Conflict of Laws. RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS
(1934) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT (FIRST)].
"In their heyday, the vested rights
theories ultimately embodied in the first Restatement of Conflicts were consonant
with formal approaches to justice that sought predictability and uniformity at any
price. The price-failure to respond to policy-has proved too high a price to pay."
Donald T. Trautman, Reflections on Confllct-of-Laws Methodology, 32 HASTINGS L.J.
1612, 1613 (1981) (citations omitted).
But see, Perry Dane, Vested Rights,
"Vestedness," and Choice of Law, 96 YALE L.J. 1191 (1987).
60. In 1989, Professor Solimine counted that, within the United States,
about 23 states follow the Restatement Second, 14 follow lex loci delicti (this count
may be congruent with vested rights), four follow Professor Leflar's approach and
one (California) follows Professor Baxter's approach. Of the remaining eight, two
follow a presumption of the applicability of forum law and six follow some form of
unclassified interest analysis.
Solimine, supra note 23, at 54-55 nn.32-33.
Professor Solimine has updated and explicated certain components of this count.
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sketches 6 ' of three leading approaches to conflict of laws: (1)
Beale's vested rights approach;6 2 (2) Currie's interest analysis; 6 3
and (3) Leflar's choice influencing considerations and better law
factor. 64 Part III of this Article then examines the major antecedents of the proposal: (1) Baxter's comparative impairment
approach;6 5 and (2) the emergent law and economics approach.
The purpose of this discussion is to describe, from several perspectives, the problem with conflict of laws, and to provide a
reference to be used to show how these formulations are (and are
not) encompassed by this Article's proposal. It is hoped that this
exposition will also further delineate the proposal.
A. FundamentalIssues In Conflict of Laws
The following are the four diads that together comprise the

fundamental issues in conflict of laws.

Michael E. Solimine, Choice of Law In the American Courts In 1991. 40 AM. J.
COMP. L. 951 (1992).
61. For more complete overviews of the development of choice of law theory,
see LEA BRILMAYER, AN INTRODUCTION TO JURISDICTION IN THE AMERICAN FEDERAL
SYSTEM 215-47 (1986), ROGER C. CRAMTON ET AL., CONFLICT OF LAWS 1-135 (4th ed.

1987), and EUGENE F. SCOLES & PETER HAY, CONFLICT OF LAWS 4-47 (1982).
62. JOSEPH BEALE, A TREATISE ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS (1935). Beale's approach was incorporated in the Restatement (First). RESTATEMENT (FIRST). supra
note 59. This approach is sometimes described as the territorial, situs or lex loci
delicti approach. Solimine, supra note 23, at 57. Juenger notes that the lex loci
delicti rule is not only subject to numerous exceptions, but there is no agreement
on what "place of the wrong" means. According to some authorities, the law of the
place of wrongful conduct controls; according to others, the law of the place of
injury, and in several states, such as France, the question of which of the two
applies Is unsettled. JUENGER, supra note 1, at 50 (citations omitted).
63. See CURRiE, supra note 1. Currie's approach had a significant influence
on the Restatement Second.
64. Professor Leflar expanded on Currie's approach, positing a balancing test
to resolve "true conflicts" which, among its other considerations, considers what
law provides the "better rule". Robert A. Leflar, Cholce-Influenclng Considerations
In Conflicts Law, 41 N.Y.U. L. REv. 267 (1966) [hereinafter Chotce-Influenclng
Considerations]; Robert A. Leflar, Conflicts. Law: More Choice-Influenclng
Considerations,54 CAL. L. REv. 1584, 1586-1588 (1966) [hereinafter More ChoiceInfluencing Considerations]. See also ROBERT A. LEFLAR ET AL.. AMERICAN CONFLICTS
LAw (4th ed. 1986).

65. Baxter, supra note 14.
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Predictability and Administrability Versus Accuracy"

This first diad accepts the notion that there is a tradeoff
between simplicity and accuracy: the more we simplify, the less
accurate we can be in conflicts determinations. This diad is

derived, but distinct, from another diad famliar in the literature:
conflicts justice versus substantive justice.
Predictability,
certainty, and uniformity of result are normally viewed as
comprising the term "conflicts justice."
Predictability and
certainty are the central conflicts justice factors that are considered under the first diad. Predictability is equated with what
Professor Baxter refers to as "primary predictability"-the ability
of people to plan their affairs based on the knowledge of the law
that will govern their conduct in the event of litigation. 67
Certainty is related to what Baxter terms "secondary predictability": the ability of lawyers to predict what law will be applied
once a matter is brought to litigation.68 However, certainty may
be important less for this reason than for another reason:
adrninistrability-the ability of courts to apply conflicts rules with
certainty at minimum cost. Uniformity of result, which is often
included in this diad under the heading of "conflicts justice," is
considered below as a part of the diad between unilateralism and
multilateralism. However, without uniformity of result among all
possible fora, predictability and certainty are jeopardized.
Most importantly, "accuracy" is referred to under this first
diad, rather than substantive justice. As set forth more fully
below, the idea of substantive justice as a concern of conflict of
laws should be approached with extreme caution. 6 9 "Accuracy"
connotes the idea that there is something normative involved in
determining which legal rules apply to particular matters.7 0 The
normative issue is not, however, substantive justice in the outcome of the case, but accuracy in determining which legal rules

66. There is little new in this diad.

See, e.g., Paul H. Neuhaus, Legal

Certainty Versus Equity In the Conflict of Laws, 28 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 795
(1963).
67.

Baxter, supranote 14, at 3.

68. Id.
69. See Infra text accompanying notes 143-65.
70. One might argue that accuracy has something to do with the proscription of arbitrariness found in Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302, 312313 (1981) (plurality opinion). By requiring that choices of law be based on

"[slignificant aggregation of contacts, creating state interests, such that choice of
its law is neither arbitrary nor fundamentally unfair," this opinion established a
requirement for some degree of accuracy. Id. at 313. Unfortunately, in the
Allstate decision, the Court accepted a relatively low degree of accuracy. Id.
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best match the particular matter. 7 1 "Conflicts justice," like any
other "procedural" value, is worthy of protection and must
sometimes trump a particular judge's views of "substantial
Justice." 72 Indeed, this type of accuracy may be the type of
systemic value that speaks to the fundamental structure of our
society, like a constitution, and may therefore be worthy of extraordinary protection. 73
It is worth noting that there is an additional relationship between predictability and accuracy. Predictability may be viewed

as the realization, in private conduct, of accuracy:

it allows

private actors to conform their conduct to the appropriate or
accurate rule and thus to act efficiently. 7 4
2.

Unilateralism Versus Multilateralism

This second diad addresses the question of whether the
forum, in making conflicts decisions, should think in terms only
of forum policy or interests, or of the policies or interests of other
Jurisdictions as well. While many conflicts specialists apparently
agree that this is a critical and central issue, it has been disputed
whether this dichotomy is actually as sharp as sometimes drawn.
It is clear that forum self-interest must include regard for other
fora. Thus, a forum with a long-sighted perspective on a conflict
of laws problem will wish to integrate nonforum policies into its
analysis. It will do so in anticipation of reciprocity, in order to
avoid overextensions of its power and legitimacy and because,
under the proposal, it would in any event be accorded power
sufficient to address local effects (subject to concerns of
administrability). Perhaps the better question is how much
unilateralism and how much multilateralism should figure into
the forum's considerations?
As noted above, however, this issue is important for another
reason: it affects predictability and accuracy. If each forum
approaches conflicts issues from its own narrowly unilateral,
parochial perspective, each forum will determine in a different

way which law to apply. This difference further diminishes predictability and accuracy by raising the potential for effective
forum shopping.

71.
Justice.
72.
73.
74.

One might call this procedural Justice or a different kind of conflicts

See FOUNDATIONS, supra note 47, at 153-55.
See Infra text accompanying notes 155-62.
See FOUNDATIONS, supranote 47, at 176-77.
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Private Versus Public Interests

This third diad considers whose interests are addressed by
conflict of laws; the state or the private person. In truth, this is
an only partially valid distinction. The critical factor in this diad

is pablic interests, which, in a market economy, include private
interests. Sometimes the public interest is the protection of
private interests. When it is not, conflict of laws (and law

generally) should not be concerned with private interests.
Traditional conflict of laws or private international law contained
a "public law taboo" 75 that prevented courts from giving effect to
foreign fiscal, regulatory, or penal law. 7 6 However, "the classical

75. Andreas Lowenfeld, Public Law In the International Arena: Conflict of
Laws, InternationalLaw, and Some Suggestionsfor Their Interaction, 163 R.C.A.D.I.
311, 323-24 (1979); ANDREAS LOWENFELD, INTERNATIONAL LITIGATION AND
ARBITRATION 1 (1993) ("Traditionally, in all countries, conflict of laws has been
confined to controversies under private law."). The English case of Holman v.
Johnson, 98 Eng. Rep. 1120 (K.B. 1775). is often cited for this principle. See
Baxter, supra note 14, at 12 n.26 ("The dictum of Mr. Chief Justice Marshall in
The Antelope, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 66, 123 (1825), that 'the courts of no country
execute the penal laws of another' has been applied in the choice-of-law context,
sometimes narrowly. Loucks v. Standard Oil Co., 120 N.E. 198 (1918), and
sometimes broadly, Doggrell v. Southern Box Co., 208 F.2d 310 (6th Cir. 1953),
but has never been adequately justified."). See also Jeffery C. Atik, Note: The
Problem of Reciprocity In TransnationalEnforcement of Tax Judgments, 8 YALE J.
WORLD PUB. ORD. 156 (1981).
76. This public law taboo is breaking down in piecemeal ways. First, it is
recognized that a conflict of laws for public law is necessary. See RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW §§ 401-403 (1987) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT
(THID)] (establishing a system for determining the propriety of assertions of
prescriptive jurisdiction). Second, governments make positive law in this area by
entering into agreements that allocate Jurisdiction. So far, this has occurred
mostly in the area of taxation by virtue of double taxation treaties, and within the
European Community. With respect to enforcement of tax laws in the United
States interstate system, see FOUNDATIONS, supra note 47. at 160 n.30. In the
international arena, much of the progress has been at the administrative
cooperation level.
International tax treaties typically include enforcement
cooperation provisions.
See, e.g., RICHARD L. KAPLAN, FEDERAL TAXATION OF
INTERNATIONAL TRANSACTIONS 370-82 (1988); SOL PICCIOTTO, INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS
TAXATION 58-63 (1992); Karen B. Brown, Allowing Tax Laws to Cross Borders to
Defeat InternationalAvoidance: The Convention on Mutual Administrative Assistance
In Tax Matters, 15 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 1 (1989); MICHEL W.E. GLAUTIER & FREDERICK
W. BASSINGER, A REFERENCE GUIDE TO INTERNATIONAL TAXATION 385 (1987). The
United States Securities and Exchange Commission has negotiated a series of
memoranda of understanding on enforcement cooperation. See, e.g., Elizabeth E.
Barlow, Note, Enforcing Securities Regulations Through Bilateral Agreements with
the United Kingdom and Japan:An Interim Measure or a Solution?, 23 TEX. INT'L L.J.
251 (1988); United States Securities and Exchange Commission. Report of the
Staff of the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission to the Senate Committee on
Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs and the House Committee on Energy and
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distinction between public and private law, in so far as it affects
transnational activity, has long been overtaken-one could well
say overwhelmed-by events." 77 Because private law no longer
can be said to be a mere matter of taste having no impact on
public policy, a conflict of laws for public law is needed.7 8 This
third diad is related to the first diad, as predictability is the type
of private value that also should be considered a public value in a
market economy.
4.

Institutional Competence: Courts Versus Legislatures

This fourth diad raises the question of which issues are appropriate for determination by courts, and which issues should
be left to legislatures. This is a question of relative institutional
competence, of administrability (relating to the first diad), and of
political legitimacy (or "horizontal" federalism). Conflict of laws
goes to the core of political power. Many are skeptical of the
ability and the legitimacy of courts determining the bounds of
states' political power. This issue relates to the scope of forum
power, as well as to the scope of foreign power. Therefore, in the
international conflicts setting, it is a foreign policy issue, which
normally is committed to the executive branch. 7 9
B. Form Over Substance: Beale's Vested Rights Approach
Vested rights is the doctrinal approach to conflict of laws
most firmly associated with traditional legal scholarship, and the
view of law as an autonomous discipline able to decide cases in

Commerce on the Internationalizationof the Securities Markets VII-27-77 (1987);
Ronald E. Bornstein & N. Elaine Dugger, International Regulation of Insider
Trading, 1987 COLUM. Bus. L. REv. 375 (1987).
Finally, the United States

Department of Justice has signed some enforcement cooperation agreements in
the area of antitrust. See, e.g., Agreement on the Application of Their Competition
Laws, September 23, 1991, reprinted In 30 I.L.M. 1487 (1991); Memorandum of

Understanding as to Notification, Consultation, and Cooperation with Respect to
the Application of National Antitrust Laws, March 9, 1984, U.S.-Can., reprintedIn
23 I.L.M. 275 (1984).
77.

Lowenfeld, supra note 75, at 326.

78.

See Weintraub, supra note 30, at 1818 (arguing that neither a choice-of-

law approach nor the effects test is appropriate in the area of public law, such as

securities regulation or antitrust).
79. Courts may avoid this foreign policy issue under the rubric of forum non
convenlens, the act of state doctrine, or perhaps sovereign immunity, but other-

wise may be placed in the uncomfortable position of making foreign policy when
they determine the scope of forum or foreign law.
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isolation from political, economic, or social factors.8 0 It envisions

that rights will "vest," or attach, in a particular jurisdiction, based
on the occurrence of certain events in that jurisdiction. For
example, rights to sue in tort would vest upon the occurrence of
legal injury, duty, and causation. 8 ' Once rights have vested in
one jurisdiction, they are to be respected in other Jurisdictions.
Thus, the law of the jurisdiction in which the last event occurs to
cause the rights to vest governs in connection with the vested
rights.8 2 This approach was articulated by Professor Beale, the
reporter for the Restatement (First) of Conflicts of Laws
(Restatement(First)).
1.

Predictability and Administrability Versus Accuracy

One purported advantage of the vested rights approach is
that "[ilt ... makes a selection by reference to objective criteria
without regard to the content of the substantive rules that compete for application."s 3 Thus, vested rights provides a theoretical
predictability, certainty and uniformity of result, not to mention

administrabffity. These results appear far more difficult, if not
impossible, to achieve under the interest analysis, better law, or

80. "Choice of law was among the last hold-outs for the formalistic, metaphysical, overly conceptualistic approaches to law; Currie brought it down to
earth." Bruce A. Posnak, Choice of Law: InterestAnalysis andIts "New Critics," 36
AM. J. COMP. L. 681, 701 (1988). See Russell J. Weintraub, The Conflict of Laws
Rejoins the Mainstream of Legal Reasoning, 65 TEx. L. REv. 215 (1986). See also
Richard A. Posner, The Decline of Law as an Autonomous Discipline: 1962-1987,
100 HARV. L. REv. 761 (1987). In an article describing the increasing inability of
legal reasoning to stand alone, Judge Posner criticizes the "destruction of
certainty in the field of conflict-of-laws . . . as a result of the replacement of
mechanical rules (such as the rule of lex loci dellcti) by 'Interest analysis' and its
many variants." Id. at 770. He indicates that this destruction is one of many
legal reforms engineered by lawyers that "appear to have miscarried" because of a
failure to bring social science methodology to bear. Id. at 769. Interestingly, the
departure from lex loci dellcitl requires that courts embrace the world of policy, as
Judge Posner recommends. See Infra text accompanying notes 195-207.
81. See RESTATEMENT (FIRST). supra note 59, §§ 378, 382, 383 (1934).
82. See RESTATEMENT (FIRST), supra note 59, §§ 42, 55, 64, 311 cmt. d, 323,
325 (contract), 377-78, 384 (torts) (1934). In fact, the vested rights doctrine as
articulated by Beale holds that forum courts never apply foreign law, but merely
enforce rights that vested in the foreign territory. See 1 JOSEPH BEALE, A TREATISE
ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 1-2, 53, 274-75, 290-91 (1935); 3 Id. at 1925, 1967-70,
1973-75. This was one of its theoretical shortcomings. See Friedrich K. Juenger,
Conflict of Laws: A Critique of Interest Analysis, 32 AM. J. COMP. L. 1, 3 (1984)
[hereinafter A Critique].
83. A Critique, supranote 82, at 2.

1000

VANDERBILT JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW

WVol. 26:975

comparative impairment approaches, each of which requires a
certain amount of analysis and judgment.
The main theoretical problem of vested rights is the
assumption that it would be possible for courts or governments of
s4
different jurisdictions to agree on when a right in fact vested.
This assumption may be grounded injus gentium, or natural law
theory, which holds that there is a basic similarity among legal
systems. 85 This similarity would make it possible to have the
same basic set of circumstances constitute "vesting" in all
A related theoretical problem, with practical
Jurisdictions.

consequences, is the problem of characterization, that is, what
sort of legal problem a given set of facts presents. If a matter is
characterized as falling under one doctrinal heading as opposed
to another, a different conflict of laws rule might apply.8 6 Courts
are thus able to manipulate outcomes by manipulating characterizations. 8 7 Moreover, harmony cannot be achieved because
characterizations differ, in good faith, from jurisdiction to jurisdiction.8 8

More important perhaps than these theoretical weaknesses
was the practical, problem that the vested rights theory did not
produce the predictability and administrability that it promised.
Interestingly, its failure to produce predictability and administrability arose because courts rebelled against the perceived
substantive injustice its strict application would work.8 9 Courts

developed exceptions, called "escape devices," to the clear vested
rights rules of the Restatement (First),which frustrated its intent
to provide predictability and administrability. These devices

84. Without such agreement, the conflict of laws benefits of predictability,
certainty, and uniformity of result would not be available, as results would depend
on the forum selected, which would determine the rule for determining whether
the relevant rights vested.
85. See JUENGER, supra note 1,at 9. The termJus gentium is used by Cicero
"in the sense of a legal system based on natural reason and having a universal
purport." Id. Of course, the existence of a universal law would obviate the need
for conflict of laws rules.
86.

See RUSSELL J. WEINTRAUB, COMMENTARY ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 47-49

(3rd ed. 1986); JUENGER, supra note 1. at 70-74.
87. See, e.g., Haumschild v. Continental Casualty Co., 95 N.W. 2d 814 (Wis.
1959) (finding that family law, rather than tort law, was the proper doctrinal
heading for an interspousal immunity issue, and consequently applying the law of
the place of family domicile, rather than that of the lex locl delicti).
88. Again, the lack ofJus gentlum uniformity belied the possibility of uniform
categories of "characterization" among jurisdictions.
89. This might be considered an instance of courts moving from an
inefficient-inaccurate-common law system, to a more accurate one. See
sources cited supra note 54. Here, it is clear that accuracy is not mere Weberian
predictability and administrability, but something more substantive.
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included the distinction between substantive and procedural
matters, 90 the possibility of renvoi,9 1 and the public policy
92
exception.
This Article's proposal values predictability, certainty, and
uniformity of result. It especially values what Baxter calls
"primary predictability": the ability of persons at the time they
are conducting their business to predict the legal consequences
of that conduct. 93 In fact, law and economics, in its liberal proceduralist zeal, might err by holding that primary predictability is
the only important value in conflict of laws. 94 However, the
proposal recognizes, as with Judge Posner and others, the need
for a tradeoff not between conflicts justice and substantive
justice, but between predictability and administrability, on the
one hand, and accuracy, on the other.

Thus, this Article's proposal values the predictability and
administrability promised by the vested rights theory. It would
recommend the use of formulas like those established under the
Restatement (First), provided that the following condition is satisfied: The incremental administration and unpredictability costs
that are saved by avoiding "full" analysis must exceed the costs
incurred by virtue of the relative inaccuracy of the formulas.95
The references used by the formulas must be accurate
enough-sufficiently reliable proxies for a full analysis-that the
use of judicially-created escape devices would not grow to
diminish the amount of administrative cost savings to the extent

90. The substantive/procedural distinction, allows the forum court to apply
Its local procedural law, but leaves open the definition of "procedural." See, e.g.,
Grant v. McAuliffe, 264 P.2d 944 (Cal. 1953) (applying California survival statute,
despite fact that Nevada was the lex Iocl delictl of automobile accident between
California residents).
91. "Renvoi" is the curious phenomenon in which one Jurisdiction's conflict
of laws rules may select the law of a second jurisdiction, and that second Jurisdiction's conflict of laws rules select the law of the first jurisdiction. See, e.g.,
Arthur T. von Mehren, The Renvol and Its Relation to Various Approaches to the
Choice-of-Law Problem. In XXTH CENTURY COMPARATIVE AND CONFLICTS LAW 380, 381
(1961); WEINTRAUB, supranote 86, at 66-71.
92. This analysis returns to the public policy exception below. See Infra text
accompanying notes 98-10 1.
93. Baxter, supra note 14, at 3. Baxter contrasts primary predictability with
secondary predictability: the ability of lawyers to predict the outcome once a
matter is litigated and the Identity of the forum is known.
94. Posner seems to tend in this direction in some of his work on the
subject. See supra note 80.
95. Here I assume that accuracy can be defined and measured.
See
discussion Infra part IV.C. Accuracy is valuable because it reduces transaction

costs in allocating costs of conduct to those responsible for the conduct.
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that the first condition is no longer satisfied. 96 When this
condition is not met, other approaches would be indicated. In
this sense, the proposal is eclectic.
2.

Unilateralism Versus Multilateralism

Vested rights theory is commonly viewed as multilateralist in
its perspective. 97 This theory is multilateralist insofar as it calls
upon the forum to treat all jurisdictions equally according to its
formulas. If the loci delicti is Dystopia, then Dystopian law
governs the tort. Vested rights theory thus also seeks to satisfy
the criterion of uniformity of result often associated with
"conflicts justice."
The exception to lex loci delicti on the basis of inconsistent

forum public policy is applied on the rationale that a forum court
should not be required to contradict its own public policy. 98 The
bounds of the public policy exception are uncharted, 9 9 and
scholars sometimes refer to the border between hospitality to
foreign law and assertion of forum's policy as "comity."' 0 0 The
public policy exception therefore calls into question the predict-

96. It Is only in this sense that the ability to achieve "substantive Justice"
seems relevant.
97. A Critique,supra note 82, at 2.
98. See, e.g., Bernstein v. Van Heyghen Freres Societe Anonyme, 163 F.2d
246, 249 (2d Cir. 1947), cert. denied, 332 U.S. 772 (1947):
(lit
is a well-settled exception to the usual doctrine that a court of the forum will take as its model the rights and liabilities which have arisen
where the transactions took place, that the foreign rights and liabilities
must not be abhorrent to the moral notions of its own state.

Id. See also Republic of Iraq v. First Nat'l City Bank, 353 F.2d 47, 51 (2d Cir.
1965) (rejecting application of foreign law "contrary to our public policy and
shocking to our sense of justice"), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 1027 (1966). This ex-

ception has its roots in Huber's De Conflictu Legum DiversarumIn Diversts Imperils.
reprintedin ERNEST LORENZEN, SELECTED ARTICLES ON THE CONFLICT OF LAws 162-80

(1947). Huber posited that a forum state would refuse to apply rights acquired
abroad if they would prejudice the forum's policies. Id. at 164.

99. See Friedrich K. Juenger, General Course on Private International Law
(1983), 193 HAGUE RECUEIL DES CouRs [H.R.D.C.] 119, 201 (1985) ("IT]he very concept of public policy spells uncertainty, unpredictability and lack of uniformity.")
Juenger explains that Savigny separated these rules of public policy from what
might, for want of a better term, be called mandatory law, or "loLs de police, rules
of immediate application and self-limiting rules." JUENGER, supra note 1, at 81.
However, one might well inquire how these rules differ from peremptory rules of
public policy, or on the other hand, from the category of public law more
generally.

100. For analytical discussions of comity, see Joel R. Paul, Comity In
InternationalLaw. 32 HARV. INT'L L.J. 1 (1991); Louise Weinberg, Against Comity,
80 GEO. L.J. 53, 94 (1991).
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ability, certainty, uniformity, and the very legal nature of the
whole conflict of laws enterprise. It makes it possible for any
forum's policy to tnunp otherwise applicable foreign law. It is,
then, a method of shifting from multilateralism to unilateralism.
Moreover, it is no less than the entire
conflict of laws question
101
embedded in a doctrinal exception.
Thus, vested rights theory purports to be multilateral. But, it
has significant potential for unilateralism, in part because of its
inaccuracy, or failure to implement the forum's policy in appropriate circumstances.
3.

Private Versus Public Interests

Vested rights theory looks to private interests, or at least
private rights, seeking to hold these rights intact after they vest,
despite the cross-border nature of a transaction. It does not
consider public interests, except under the public policy
exception discussed above. Subject to the public policy exception, it thus assumes either that conflict of laws decisions do not
affect public policy or that conflict of laws decisions under the
vested rights theory are congruent with public policy.1 0 2 Yet it is
clear that conflict of laws decisions can affect the implementation
of public policy, and that decisions under vested rights are not
necessarily congruent with effective application of public
policy.' 0 3 Currie argued that "the traditional system of conflict of laws
counsels the courts to sacrifice the interests of their own states
mechanically and heedlessly, without consideration of the policies and
1
interests involved....-

4.

04

Courts Versus Legislatures

Vested rights theory anticipates little need for legislative
action. Rather, its private law orientation is consistent with a
common law approach, and its relatively administrable formulas
are appropriate for judicial application. Thus, if the vision that

101. The public policy exception has not had as significant an effect in United
States interstate conflicts of law as it has had in Europe, as United States Judges

are more reluctant to criticize sister-state law as offending forum public policy.
JUENGER,

supra note 1, at 88-89.

102. See Infra text accompanying notes 245-61.

103. Some vested rights formulae may have a degree of congruence with
public policy. Judge Posner argues that lex locl delicti may indicate the application

of the law with the "best fit." See Infra text accompanying notes 196-207.
104. CURRm, supra note 1, at 278.
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public policy is irrelevant to conflicts issues were correct, it would
also make sense that legislatures would not involve themselves
with conflicts issues.
This is a commentary less on the
competence of courts than on the ambit of legislatures.
C. ForumPolicy Over Predictabilityand Administrability:
Currie'sInterestAnalysis
Currie, along with Cavers and Cook, led a revolution away
from the triumph of form over substance that characterized the
vested rights approach.1 0 5 This revolution was fueled by the discontent regarding the above-described theoretical and practical
shortcomings of the vested rights approach.' 0 6 A counter-

revolution, or perhaps a new revolution, is currently being led,
albeit in different directions, by Professors Brilmayer 10 7 and
08
Juenger.
Currie's early interest analysis focused unilaterally on the forum's interest, holding that forum law should apply whenever the
forum had an applicable policy.' 0 9 Thus, Currie's analysis was,

105. See WALTER W. COOK, THE LOGICAL AND LEGAL BASES OF THE CONFLICT OF

LAws (1949); CURRIE, supra note 1; David F. Cavers, A Critique of the Choice-ofLaw Problem. 47 HARv. L. REV. 173 (1933). See also Paul A. Freund, ChiefJustice
Stone and the Conflict of Laws, 59 HARv. L. REV. 1210 (1946). Currie wrote that
"Walter Wheeler Cook discredited the vested-rights theory as thoroughly as the
intellect of one man can ever discredit the intellectual product of another."
CURRIE, supra note 1, at 6. However, Currie extended Cook's analysis and
established the interest analysis approach as a competing system.
106. This revolution was also supported by two decisions of the Supreme
Court: Alaska Packers Ass'n v. Industrial Accident Conm'n, 294 U.S. 532 (1935);
Pacific Employers Ins. Co. v. Industrial Accident Comm'n, 306 U.S. 493 (1939).
These cases confirmed that more than one state might apply its law to a single
matter, because each had a sufficient interest in giving effect to its law and policy.
This departure was inconsistent with vested rights theory, holding that only the
state in which the right vested, based on the occurrence of the last event, would
have prescriptive Jurisdiction. See also Freund, supra note 105. Currie relied on
these cases to develop his interest analysis methodology.
107. See, e.g., FOUNDATIONS, supra note 47; Lea Brilmayer, Rights, Fairness
and Choice of Law, 98 YALE L.J. 1277 (1989); Lea Brilmayer, Governmental Interest
Analysis: A House Without Foundations, 46 OHIo ST. L.J. 459 (1985). See also
Infra text accompanying notes 249-59, 268-79.
108. See, e.g., JUENGER, supra note 1; Friedrich K. Juenger, Conflict of Laws:
A Critique of Interest Analysis, 32 Am. J. COMP. L. 1 (1984); Friedrich K. Juenger,

Governmental Interests-Real and Spurious--4n Multistate Disputes, 21 U.C. DAVIS
L. REV. 515 (1988).
109. CURRIE, supra note 1, at 183-84:
1. Normally, even in cases involving foreign elements, the court should
be expected, as a matter of course, to apply the rule of decision found in
the law of the forum ....
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in essence, twofold. First, he found a forum policy that was
potentially applicable. Second, he determined whether sufficient
relationships existed between the subject matter and the forum's
policy to justify application of forum policy to the subject matter:
he determined whether the forum had an "interest."1 10 If Currie
found that no forum policy was applicable, or that no foreign
policy was applicable, the matter would be termed a "false
problem," or a false conflict, and the law of the interested state
would be applied."1 ' This method is distinct from balancing
tests, insofar as it only looks at forum policy to determine the
applicability of forum policy, and only considers contacts as a
basis for interpreting whether the forum policy was intended to
112
apply.
1.

Predictability and Administrability Versus Accuracy

The limited contribution to administrability that interest
analysis provides comes not from specific rules relating particular
matters or persons to jurisdictions, but from the ability of courts
(and perhaps individuals) to determine governmental policies and
interests by the "ordinary processes of construction and
interpretation."" 3
This construction and interpretation is

4. If the court finds that the forum state has no interest in the application of its policy, but that the foreign state has, it should apply the
foreign law.
5. If the court finds that the forum state has an interest in the application of its policy, it should apply the law of the forum, even though the
foreign state also has an interest in the application of its contrary policy.
Id.
See Kay, supra note 1, at 60-78 (dividing Currie's work into two stages: the
first stage, consisting of the "selfish state" that would pursue only its own shortterm interests and not consider foreign law, and the second stage. consisting of
the "moderate and restrained state" which would consider foreign law).
110. CURRIE, supra note 1, at 183-84. "It is true that many of the 'connecting
factors' that are familiar in choice-of-law rules will be found relevant in
determining the extent of a state's interest in the application of its law and policy."
Id. at 590. For an analysis of the term "interest", see Kay, supra note 1, at 10511.
111. CURRIE, supranote 1, at 107-10.
112. See JUENGER, supra note 1, at 99-100.
113. Brainerd Currie, The Governmental Interest Methodology, In WILLIS L.M.
REESE ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON CONFLICT OF LAws 487-88 (9th ed. 1990).
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intended to divine the legislative intent regarding the scope of
prescriptive jurisdiction. 114
However, in cases of false conflicts (the easy cases), Currie's
interest analysis provides a relatively administrable rule: apply
the law of the interested jurisdiction. In cases of conflicts of
governmental interests, Currie's interest analysis values administrability as well as forum political legitimacy over accuracy,
suggesting that the forum simply apply its own law.
Professor
Brilmayer has
led the
argument
that
policies-legislative goals-are difficult to determine with any
certainty.1 1 Interests-the circumstances under which a policy
is applicable-are even more difficult to determine, as legislatures
rarely speak to this issue, yet presumably interests must also be
determined from evidence of legislative intent.1 1 6 Are interests to
be defined subjectively or objectively? Most importantly, and
similar to the attacks made on vested rights theory, Brilmayer
argues that interest analysis Is indeterminate, arbitrary, and
manipulable. I 7 "Assumptions such as the one that there are
'interests' in protecting local residents are unmasked as merely a
priori assumptions about how far interest analysts think that
legislation ought to reach."1 8
Without further empirical study, it is impossible to know
whether Currie's interest analysis is more or less predictable and
administrable than Beale's vested rights approach. As many
have pointed out, 119 predictability is a circular argument,

although one might be forgiven for thinking that vested rights,
with its preset formulas, would be more predictable than interest
analysis, which requires individual analysis of particular laws
and legislative intent. 120 On the other hand, administrability
depends on the ease with which a judge may decide the case, and
both these techniques seem to have similar degrees of ambiguity

114. Professor Juenger argues that Currie did not actually abandon the

search for appropriate contacts, as the determination of interests, as opposed to
policies, requires some contacts. Juenger argues that the contacts Currie found
most significant were often personal, as opposed to territorial ones.

JUENGER,

supra note 1, at 99-100.
115. FOUNDATIONS, supra note 47, at 45-54.
116. See Id. See also, Lea Brilmayer, Interest Analysis and the Myth of
Legislatlve Intent. 78 MICH. L. REv. 392 (1980).
117. FOUNDATIONS, supra note 47, at 84-86.
118. I& at 90-91.
119. See, e.g., Baxter, supra note 14, at 3-4.
120. As Brilmayer points out, Currie's interest analysis leaves open the
question of what to do about Judge-made law, leaving a substantial gap in the
treatment of private law. In this connection, one might argue that Currie's
interest analysis is a more appropriate methodology for public law than for private

law. See FOUNDATIONS, supranote 47, at 90-91.
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for judges to
and difficulty. Juenger points out that it is difficult
12 1
could.
they
thought
Currie
as
policies,"
"divine
It is also impossible, without further empirical study, to
know the extent of the tradeoffs of accuracy in the selection of
applicable law necessary to achieve the administrability and
predictability provided by these approaches. While vested rights
analysis takes a relatively static and theoretical approach to
accuracy, establishing certain a priori relations on which to base
decisions, interest analysis takes a more flexible and pragmatic
Currie's interest analysis, however,
approach to accuracy.
declines to analyze and compare governmental interests, and
thus abstains from accuracy.
2.

Unilateralism Versus Multilateralism

The most significant aspect of Currie's interest analysis, and
a significant point of departure from vested rights theory, is its
unilateralist perspective, at least in its early approach of considering only the interests of the forum state.1 22 In Currie's final
published article, he found a way to reconcile a type of interest
analysis with multilateralism by, in effect, considering the
broadest interests of the forum. 1'

This reconciliation depends on a relatiistic approach to the
narrow policy of the forum law, reducing its scope in light of
broader "interstate or international system" type forum
policies.

x2 4

121. JUENGER, supra note 1, at 132-33.
122. See Kay, supranote 1, at 48-78.

123. Currie stated:
[Tbo assert a conflict between the interests of the forum and the foreign

state is a serious matter; the mere fact that a suggested broad conception
of a local interest will create conflict with that of a foreign state is a sound
reason why the conception should be re-examined, with a view to a more
moderate and restrained interpretation both of the policy and of the circumstances in which it must be applied to effectuate the forum's legitimate
purpose.
CURRiE, supranote 42, at 757.

124. By this statement, Currie let the camel's nose into the tent. It Is not
clear how far Currie would license a court to develop a "more moderate and
restrained interpretation." Recall Currie's earlier words:
I do not know where to draw the line between the judicial legislation
that is 'molecular,' or permissible, and that which is 'molar,' or impermissible. But assessment of the respective values of the competing legitimate interests of two sovereign states, in order to determine which Is to
prevail, is a political function of a very high order.
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Brilmayer has criticized interest analysis on the basis that it
focuses only on substantive interests, not on conflicts interests 12or
5
diplomatic interests (one might call these multistate policies):
the interest in avoiding overreaching the state's limits.I 25 Thus,
Brilmayer states that "[one might very well question the simple
assumption . . . that a state maximizes its substantive selfinterest by applying its law whenever it has an interest in having
its law applied to the case before it."12 7 There are at least three
ways, however, in which Currie's range of interests might be
viewed as inclusive of multistate policies. First, Currie did not
specifically exclude multistate policies and might be interpreted
in some places as having included them in his formulations.'2
Second, Currie's method includes a distinct step, after policies
are determined, of determining interests. 12 9
This interest
determination includes a consideration of multi-state policies,
recognizing that when no appropriate nexus exists, no interest
exists. 13 0 Third, in Currie's later work, he recognized that a
policy might be moderated in cases of true conflicts.' 3 ' This
represents an accommodation between substantive policy and

multistate policy. While we may agree that Currie is at least
ambiguous regarding the inclusion of multistate policies, it
appears clear today that interest analysis must consider a full
range of interests and that doing so complicates the endeavor
considerably. 132

CURRI, supra note 1, at 182 (citations omitted).
125. See VON MEHREN & TRAUTMAN, supranote 5,at 215-326.
126. FouNDAnTONs, supra note 47,at 71.
127. Id. at 75. Thus Brilmayer asks "[wihy Is it that only substantive policies
matter, as opposed to choice of law policies?" Id. at 76.
128. See, e.g., CURRIE, supra note 1. at 186 ("IT]here is room for restraint and
enlightenment in the determination of what state policy is and where state interests lie.").
129. See Id. at 183-84.
130. Id. at 727 ("Governmental-nterest analysis determines the relevance of
the relationship [between the case and the state with the potentially applicable
policy] by inquiring whether it furnishes a reasonable basis for the state's
assertion of an interest in applying the policy."). One might argue that this
"reasonableness" test imports the same kind of multilateral approach as that of
the Restatement (Third)'s "reasonableness" test. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra
note 76, § 403.
131. See CURRIE, supra note 42,at 764-85.
132. See CURRIE, supra note 1, at 186-87. Currie refers to criticism of his
failure to consider "governmental policies other than those that are expressed in
specific statutes and rules: the policy of promoting a general legal order, that of
fostering amicable relations with other states, that of vindicating reasonable
expectations, and so on." Id. He responds:
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Private Versus Public Interests
Governmental interest analysis has been severely criticized

for its failure to consider private interests, and its consideration
of public interests in private law matters. 13 3 The argument for a
separate conflict of laws for private law-one that does not
consider public policy-is that these private rules are merely
facultative and entail no public policy interests whatsoever. A
determination of which rules should be applied, therefore, should
not consider any aspect of public policy, but only private factors.
Gerhard Kegel has argued this point forcefully, from a European
conflict of laws tradition, criticizing Currie's interest analysis for

failing to take account of the difference between private law and

public law.' 3 4 However, one may simply define Kegel's criticism
out of existence by encompassing within public policy the
facilitation of private commerce. In fact, Currie did this in

1961.136
Provided one accepts as part of public policy-as part of
society's interest-the

interest

in

efficiency

in

private

trans-

actions, there is no longer a preserved sphere for private law. 136

Llet us first clear away the apparatus that creates false problems and obscures the nature of the real ones. Only then can we effectively set about
ameliorating the ills that arise from a diversity of laws by bringing to bear
all the resources of Jurisprudence, politics, and humanism-each in Its appropriate way.
Id&at 187 (citations omitted). This hopeful perspective is also frustrating: Currie
is not willing to proceed to incorporate a full range of policies until vested rights is
first defeated. It appears that vested rights is now defeated, and it is time to fulfill
Currie's promise. This Article's proposal adopts the multidisciplinary approach
recommended by Currie.
133. See Kegel, supra note 25; Kay, supra note 1, at 79-85; Friedrich K.
Juenger. Governmental Interests-Real and Spurlous-4n Multistate Disputes, 21
U.C. DAvIS L. REV. 515, 518-30 (1988); JUENGER, supranote 1, at 123-28.
134. See Kegel, supra note 25.
135. Currie stated: "I can find no place in conflict-of-laws analysis for a
calculus of private interests. By the time the interstate plane is reached the
resolution of conflicting private interests has been achieved; it is subsumed in the
statement of the laws of the respective states." CuRRImE, supra note 1. at 610.
Another way of looking at this issue is that "the private interests in choice cases
are necessarily in balance, and that the cases can be decided by viewing them as
instances of conflicting state interests rather than of conflicting private interests."
Baxter, supra note 14, at 22.
136. From a law and economics standpoint, all law may be viewed as serving
this purpose. Under this vision, all public law, as well as private law, is intended
to reduce the transaction costs-the market failures-that would otherwise be incurred. See COASE, supra note 26, at 37-47. However, one might argue that not
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One might state the converse of this: There is a public interest
worth considering in conflicts problems, even those that relate to
private law (if the term is meaningful). It seems a tautology that if
government is unconcerned, then government should be uninvolved. There is an extensive body of law and economics
scholarship analyzing traditional private law topics such as torts,
contracts, and property (and in fact emphasizing these topics),
finding that these "neutral" bodies of law may be more or less
efficient, satisfying the public interest in efficiency to a greater or
lesser degree.13 7 If one accepts the premise of this analysis, there
is a significant public interest in efficiency implicated by private
law rules.
The proposal of this Article recognizes this
relationship.
4.

Courts Versus Legislatures

Currie opposed interest balancing by courts: an explicit
comparison of links with, or policies of, the societies competing
for prescriptive jurisdiction.138 He had two reasons for this view:

institutional competence and democracy.

Currie opined that

courts lack the resources to analyze and balance policy
interests.1 3 9 Currie argued that courts also should not engage in
balancing, as they lack the political legitimacy conferred by the
democratic process and must act unilaterally, in conformity with
40
the policy decisions of the legislature.'
Thus, Currie found only a secondary role for courts, as handmaidens of the legislature. Brilmayer and others have'criticized
interest analysis because it relies too much on forum positive
law; courts and scholars are left no creative function, while
legislatures have abdicated the conflicts function. This leaves a
gap in coverage, which in practical terms means cases are
decided without analysis of what makes sense. This relates
strongly to Currie's forum law default option: in case of a clash of
interests, the court must back away from controversy and apply
its own law.' 4 1 Currie's position is too absolute, but it is

all law serves this purpose; some law may be equated with consumption from an
economic standpoint: it reduces efficiency in order to provide something people
want.
137. See generally ECONOMIC ANALYSIS, supra note 23.
138. CURRIE, supra note 1, at 182, 601-02; Brainerd Currie, The Constitution
and the Choice of Law: GovernmentalInterests and the JudicialFunction, 26 U. Cm.
L. Rsv. 9, 75-84 (1958).
139. CURRm, supra note 1, at 182.
140. Id.
141. See FOUNDATIONS, supra note 47, at 4-5.
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motivated by a valid concern. The proposal recognizes that
legislatures, executives, and courts have a role in the conflicts
process, as politics is embedded in conflicts; the allocation of
authority to these types of bodies would, in an ideal world,
14 2
depend on their comparative advantages.
D. JudicialDiscretionand Result-Oriented Substance
Over Conflicts Justice: Leflar's Choice-Influencing
Considerationsand Better Law Factor
Around the time of Currie's death in 1965, Professor Leflar
introduced a system that provides extreme flexibility to the judge
in balancing vague and possibly contradictory factors, including
one factor that seems substantively attractive, but that belies any
pretense that the field of conflict of laws might make toward
procedural regularity. 143 Leflar included the question of which
law is better as one of the factors to be considered in determining
the applicable law.144 If one were to disregard predictability and
achninistrability, and if one were arrogant as to one's ability to
determine whether one law soberly prescribed is better than

another, the answer to the conflict of laws problem would be
simple: apply the better law. 14 5 It should be noted that Leflar
sought to be descriptive of what courts actually do, not to
14 6
propose a coherent theory.

142. See generally Uncertainty and Chaos, supra note 6.
143. See sources cited supra note 64.
144. See
Choice-Influencing Considerations, supra note
64;
More
Cholce-lnfluencing Considerations,supra note 64, at 1586-88; ROBERT A. LEFLAR ET
AL., supra note 64, at 298. Interestingly, as noted below, a law and economics
approach that considered only private sector efficiency, and ignored (i) public
sector efficiency--efficiency in the allocation of governmental responsibility--and
(ii) predictability and administrability, would argue that the application of the
most efficient rule (the law and economics definition of "best" law) makes the most
sense. See Infra text accompanying note 319.
145. Magister Aldricus, a Bologna glossator of the Middle Ages, voiced this
solution. In response to a question regarding which law should apply to parties
from different jurisdictions, he responded that the proper choice would be the
"better and more useful" law. JUENGER, supra note 1, at 12; Hessel E. Yntema,
The Comlty Doctrine, 65 MCH. L. REV. 9, 12 (1966). Application of the better rule
of law, however, is only one of Leflar's eclectic list of factors. This list includes the
following:
(A) Predictability of results; (B) Maintenance of interstate and
international order; (C) Simplification of the judicial task; (D) Advancement of the
forum's governmental interests; and (E) Application of the better rule of law. See
LEFLAR ET AL., supra note 64, at 279.
146. Choice-Influencing Considerations, supra note 64, at 327 ("it is a somewhat idealized description of the present system of choice-of-law decision designed
to accept substantially what happens now, together with current trends, and to
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There are two relevant aspects of Leflar's system:
its
balancing test structure and its use of the better law factor.
These aspects are related, as each affords great discretion to
Judges charged with determining conflicts cases. Other balancing
test structures include the "most significant relationship" test
contained in the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws
(Restatement (Second)),14 7 the similar test contained in the
Restatement (Third) of ForeignRelations Law, 14s and the "center of
gravity" test used in New York. 149
The better law approach may provide a means of judicial
escape from an archaic or otherwise disfavored legal rule,' 5 0 but
it also provides an opportunity for ethnocentrism. 5 1 The law

give the real reasons (which on the whole are good reasons) for the law as it
currently operates."). In effect, Leflar argued the efficiency, or at least the relative
quality, of the common law approach.
147. RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 52, § 145(1): "The rights and
liabilities of the parties... are determined by the local law of the state which...
has the most significant relationship to the occurrence and the parties under the
principles stated in § 6." Id. Section 6(2) refers to the following factors:
(a) the needs of the interstate and international systems,
(b) the relevant policies of the forum,
(c) the relevant policies of other interested states and the relative

Interests of those states in the determination of the particular issue,
(d) the protection ofjustified expectations,
(e) the basic policies underlying the particular field of law,
(f) certainty, predictability and uniformity of result, and
(g) ease in the determination and application of the law to be applied.
Id. § 6(2).
The Restatement (Second) contains references to specific factors in connection
with specific types of cases, including contract (§ 188(2)) and tort (§ 145(2)). In
this sense, it is a hybrid.
148. RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 46, §§ 401-403.
149. See Babcock v. Jackson, 191 N.E. 2d 279, 284 (N.Y. 1963); Auten v.
Auten, 124 N.E. 2d 99, 101-02 (N.Y. 1954). See also Miller v. Miller, 237 N.E. 2d
877, 879 (N.Y. 1968) (emphasizing state interests in conflicts analysis). The
author thanks Professor Weintraub for pointing out that the New York Court of
Appeals has recently characterized Its approach in some types of cases as
"interest analysis" rather than as the "center of gravity" approach. See, e.g.. Istim,
Inc. v. Chemical Bank, 581 N.E. 2d 1042 (N.Y. 1991). The court appears to retain
the center of gravity approach for contract cases. See Allstate Ins. Co. v. Stolarz
(In re Allstate Ins. Co.), 613 N.E. 2d 936 (N.Y. 1993).
150. See, e.g., Schlemmer v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 730 S.W.2d 217 (Ark.
1987) (court applies Leflar's choice-influencing factors to find that Arkansas'
"archaic" guest statute cannot bar recovery to a Tennessee plaintiff injured in
Arkansas, even though injury caused by loss of control of automobile by Arkansas
driver).
151. These opportunities for ethnocentrism seem readily embraced in current
scholarship. See JUENGER, supra note 1. at 156 ("A choice-of-law mechanism that
invokes one domestic rule of decision or the other without regard to its intrinsic
merits is therefore bound to produce unsatisfactory results."); Joseph W. Singer, A
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requires escape valves in varying contexts to allow justice to
override formal rules. It is nevertheless worth evaluating the cost
of the escape valves in terms of frustration of predictability and
administrabflity, not to mention
judicial error regarding what
52
exactly is the best rule of law.'
1.

Predictability and Administrability Versus Accuracy

One may consider balancing tests as precursors of this
Article's proposal, insofar as they seek to weigh all of the relevant
policy factors to arrive at decisions. To the extent that they
consider predictability and administrability, on the one hand, and
some form of accuracy, on the other, these tests would call for a
court to compromise between them.
Balancing tests are troubling, however, because they contain
no instructions to courts (or other users) about how to value the
15 3
varying factors, which typically point in opposite directions.
For example, it is not clear how Leflar would handle the tradeoff
between predictability and administrability (Leflar's factors (A)
and (C)), on the one hand, and accuracy, on the other, as his
factors might be read to include both.'5 4 Balancing tests are not

PragmaticGuide to Conflicts, 70 B.U.L. REV. 731, 747 (1990) ("[T]he first step in
any conflicts analysis should be to determine which law is better as a matter of
justice and policy."). While these statements are no doubt descriptive of judicial
reasoning in many cases, "[h]owever much... in practice the judge's choice of law
may be influenced by his preference for the content of one law or another, it is
inadvisable to elevate a fact of human weakness to a principle of legislative
policy." Otto Kahn-Freund. GeneralProblems of PrivateInternationalLaw, 143 (III)
H.R.D.C. 139, 466 (1974).
Conflict of laws should not seek to allocate power to those who use it the best,
as it will never attain legitimacy on that basis. Rather, conflict of laws should
seek to establish mechanisms that will encourage those allocated power to use it
as best they can, by diminishing opportunities for externalization.
152. See Professor Juenger's solution infra in notes 155-60 and accompanying

text.
153. For a scathing criticism, see Reinsurance Co. of America, Inc. v.
Administratia Asigurarilor de Stat, 902 F.2d 1275, 1283 (7th Cir. 1990)
(Easterbrook, J., concurring) ("I would be most reluctant to accept an approach
that calls on the district judge to throw a heap of factors on a table and slice and
dice to taste.").
154. Leflar recognizes this. See Choice-Inluenclng Considerations,supra note
64, at 281. Brilmayer points out that "the cases applying Leflar's system have not
paid much attention to the factors of predictability and maintenance of interstate
order." They have focused instead on forum interests and the choice of the better
law. FOUNDATIONS, supra note 47, at 64-65. However, it is necessary to note that
the choice of the better law is not the same as accuracy in the sense that I have
used it.
I have referred to accuracy as a type of conflicts accuracy-the
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accurate, absent appropriate factors and a metric by which to
measure each factor, and lack predictability if applied in a
blanket fashion.
Professor Juenger has taken up the argument for the better
law approach, calling it the "substantive" or "teleological" approach.1 5 5 He points to the escape devices used to avoid the

harsh results of the Restatement (First)and to the soft connecting
factors of the Restatement (Second) as manifestations of this
better law approach.156 He argues that, since conflicts law never
provided predictability in the past and judges are often in the
position to make law, 157 one should not cavil at the possibility of
diminished predictability and increased judicial legislation. 158 He
accords little value to conflicts justice or to the procedural and
15 9
systemic values provided by consistent and predictable rules.
However, he argues that his substantive approach "would yield

application of the better-matched law, not necessarily the application of the better
law.
155. See Friedrich K. Juenger. What Now?. 46 OHIO ST.L.J. 509, 523 (1985);
JUENGER, supra note 1, at 191-237.

156. Id. at 233.
157. One scholar notes:
In a democratic and pluralist society, the standards for judgment cannot
be purely personal or irrational; the judge must be guided by generally
recognized standards capable of rational cognition. This is the essential
difference between a democratic legal order and a so-called Khadi justice
which decides individual cases in accordance with the judge's sense of
equity and without reliance on any objective standards.
Neuhaus, supra note 66, at 802 (citations omitted).
158. JUENGER, supra note 1. at 199-202.

159. "Concepts like conflicts justice and governmental interests are but verbal
Justifications for approaches premised on a preconceived notion, namely that
Judges should adjudicate multistate disputes in a rarefied atmosphere unpolluted
by ordinary human concerns." Id. at 200. Juenger later explains why most
United States scholars have ignored the pragmatic turn by courts to this
"substantive" approach with a quote from Cavers: "... asking the judge simply to
express a preference between . . . two rules on the score of 'Justice and convenience' is to abolish our centuries-old subject." Id. at 234-35 (quoting DAVID
CAVERS, THE CHOICE-OF-LAw PROCESS 86 (1965)).

I agree with Cavers, but unlike Juenger, find important procedural and
constitutional values in "our centuries-old subject." In fact, as noted at the
beginning of this Article, these values have become more important in the latter
half of the 20th century. Thus, I view the better law principle as a dangerous
conceit, as it Is lawless and unprincipled. It trivializes the work of legislators,
lawyers, and judges by holding that in cases of uncertainty, multistate society
does not care which law is applied, but will leave this question to the unguided
discretion of its Judges. Some may argue that the discretion is guided by the
qualifier "better". If this were acceptable in a government of laws, and not of men,
it would not be necessary to have laws at all, but only Khadis.
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greater predictability and uniformity than either unilateralism or
multilateralism" because it would diminish incentives for forum
160
shopping.
As any lawyer knows, the legal vocation is to synthesize, integrate, and balance competing policies, including substantive and
procedural ones. In a system of divided sovereignty,' 6 ' an
important procedural policy is that of local legislative autonomy.
Of course, this procedural policy has substantive values rooted in
the nature of our society. Juenger would subordinate this local
legislative autonomy to the independent decisions of judges
16 2
seeking the substantive best results in each particular case.
Thus, the better law factor is somewhat inconsistent with the
type of accuracy posited here as a value: which legal rules best

match the particular matter.
2.

Unilateralism Versus Multilateralism

Leflar's formulation is a hybrid, but is more unilateral than
multilateral in character. It refers to the "advancement of the
forum's governmental interests," but not to foreign governmental
interests, except indirectly through "maintenance of interstate
and international order" and, perhaps, "application of the better
rule of law."16 3 The better rule of law would be determined
multilaterally, on the basis of modernity, effectiveness, and
justice. It would not be determined situationally, on the basis of

160. JUENGER, supra note 1, at 236.
161. Divided sovereignty exists in both international and domestic realms.
162. It is submitted that what I would term Juenger's "conflicts nihilism"

would undermine not only local legislative autonomy, but also the mutual
deference and respect that is the glue of any horizontal intergovernmental system.
One response to this argument might be that Juenger is not a nihilist, but has
actually taken a leap of faith to cast aside the narrow and inhumane
proceduralism of the discipline that he leads. I would argue that what is needed
is neither conflicts nihilism nor conflicts theology, but rather conflicts existentialism.
163. Choice-lnfluenclng Considerattons,supra note 64, at 287 ("The most that

can be safely said of [other states' interests] is that they constitute a relevant
factor for consideration."). See also More Choice-Influencing Considerations,supra
note 64, at 1586 ("No forum whose concern with a set of facts is negligible should
claim priority for its law over the law of a state which has a clearly superior
concern with the facts; nor should any state's choice-of-law system be based upon
deliberate across-the-board 'forum preference.'").
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which rule of law provides the better answer to the case at
164
hand.
Juenger argues in support of his substantive or teleological
approach that "if unilateralism and multilateralism have been
failures, the only choice-of-law approach left is one that looks to
values that transcend state boundaries." 16 5 Thus, Juenger sees a
substantive approach as accessing an abstract, delocalized
justice, a "brooding omnipresence in the sky." While this
approach indeed appears neither multilateral nor unilateral, it
seems to have no political or social base. Other balancing tests

may be considered precursors of the proposal insofar as these
tests are often, although not always, relatively multilateral in
their approach. 166
3.

Private Versus Public Interests

Leflar's choice-influencing factors, as well as both the
Restatement (Second) of Conflicts of Law and the Restatement
(Third) of Foreign Relations Law, incorporates both public policy
and, in the form of protection of Justified expectations, private
interests. 16 7 In this sense, they might be considered precursors
of the proposal, although they do not aid in indicating what expectations are justified and when such justified expectations
should be frustrated in consideration of other policies. Again, the
lack of a metric by which to measure private interests against
public interests is problematic.
4.

Courts Versus Legislatures

168
Balancing tests, when placed in the hands of courts,
impose a heavy burden on courts, in terms of legitimacy and in
terms of competence. This Article's proposal would do so as well,
but would seek to allocate responsibility to resolve conflicts
problems on an ex ante basis to the legislature and to the

164. Choice-Influenclng Consideratlons,supra note 64, at 297 ("A choice made
between competing rules of law is more impersonal, less subjective, more in
keeping with the traditional law-discovering functions of a common-law court.").
165. JUENGER, supranote 1. at 236.

166. See the balancing tests contained in Restatement (Second) and
Restatement (Third). See RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 52, § 6; RESTATEMENT
(THIRD), supra note 76. § 403.
167. RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 52, § 6; RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra

note 76, § 403.
168. Comments (a) and (g) of § 403 of the Restatement (Third)would encourage
the application of its balancing tests by legislators and executives, as well as by
courts. RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 76. § 403 cmts. a. g.
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executive, when appropriate, assigning these problems to courts
on an ex post basis only when it would be most efficient to do so.
The better law test exalts judges over legislators, allowing
conflicts to provide an opportunity for judges to evaluate and
accept the better law,- something they are not explicitly permitted
to do in other cases.
Ill.

ANTECEDENTS OF THE PROPOSAL

Baxter's comparative impairment approach, based on his
1963 article, continues to provoke comment. 169 The comparative
impairment approach is a precursor of, or an initial attempt at, a
law and economics approach to conflicts. The comparative impairment approach, and the law and economics approaches
described below, are antecedents of this Article's proposal.
A. Embracing Complexity to Improve InterestAnalysis:
Baxter's ComparativeImpairmentApproach
Baxter's comparative impairment methodology constitutes
another attempt, more modest than that of the better law
approach, to provide normative criteria to the conflict of laws
process. Baxter's proposal may be viewed as a middle ground
between Currie's refusal to address real conflicts, and the
Juenger argument 170 that only substantive policy should be
considered. Baxter addresses real conflicts by reference to substantive policy, but refuses to try to evaluate substantive
policy, 1 7 ' merely measuring the extent to which each
jurisdiction's substantive policy is engaged.
Baxter carefully rejects the better law approach. He argues
that it is inconsistent with predictability and, given liberal rules of

personal jurisdiction allowing suit in the jurisdiction whose law
17 2
would lose in the better law comparison, it is unlikely to work.
Baxter's normative criterion is "maximum attainment of

169. As noted below, Judge Posner and Professors Brilmayer, Juenger, and
Solimine each take special note of Baxter's approach.
See Infra text
accompanying notes 184-87, 197.
170. As noted above, Leflar considers the better law criterion to be only one of
several bases for decision. See supra text accompanying note 144.
171. Baxter refers to this as "super-value-Judgment", as it entails deciding
between the competing value judgments already made by the relevant Jurisdictions. Baxter, supra note 14, at 5.
172. Id. at 5-6.
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underlying purpose by all governmental entities." 173

Baxter

begins with Currie's interest analysis, which he adopts as to false
conflict cases.1 7 4 Baxter's point of departure is his disagreement
with Currie's early postulate that true conflicts should simply be
17 5
resolved in favor of forum law.
More importantly, perhaps, Baxter begins to provide a
normative mandate to interest analysis or balancing. His method
provides a real advance over Currie's interest analysis. His
approach to determining conflicts problems, at least in its
analysis, allows continuous adjustment rather than limiting itself
to discrete adjustment, for Baxter Is willing to assess multiple
positive interests, a state of affairs at which Currie threw up his
hands. 1 75
However, Baxter's approach is not completely
continuous in this sense: He is willing to consider circumstances
in which two states have interests, but then would assign
complete prescriptive jurisdiction to the state with the applicable
rule "more pertinent to the case than the competing rule."17 7
Thus, Baxter's approach is continuous in its analysis, but
discrete in its assignment. This is interesting, given that Baxter
uses a hypothetical negotiation, two states negotiating the resolution of conflict of laws problems, as an expository vehicle. Baxter
hypothesizes that the rule of decision the states would arrive at in
cases of true conflicts is that the state whose interests are
impaired most should be accorded jurisdiction. 1 78 The question
left is, in a circumstance in which State A's interests are
potentially impaired forty-nine percent, and State B's interests

are potentially impaired fifty-one percent, why should State A
yield? Would it not be a dereliction of its government's duty for
State A to accept this significant impairment? One would expect
a more refined negotiation, in which the state with the smaller

173. Id. at 12.
174. Id. at 8. See supra text accompanying notes 105-42.
175. Baxter, supranote 14, at 8.
176. Baxter criticizes Currie for providing little rationale for his position that,
in cases of real conflicts, the court should simply apply forum law. Baxter points
out that this choice, dependent on the vagaries of liberal theories of personal
jurisdiction, frustrates predictability. Id. at 9-10. He cites two rationales
advanced by Currie: first, that courts lack the competence to discover the facts
that further analysis would require, and second, that this job is too political for
courts. Id. at 18 (citing Brainerd Curie, Notes on Methods and Objectives In the
Conflict of Laws. 1959 DUKE L.J. 171, 176; Brainerd Currie. The Constitution and
the Choice of Law: GovernmentalInterests and the Judicial Function, 26 U. CHI. L.
REV. 9,75-84 (1958)).
177. Id. at 9.
178. Id. at 17 ("In each real conflicts case the external objective of one state
must be subordinated."). In other parts of his article. Baxter might be read to be
more flexible.
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impairment might seek to ensure that its impairment is
minimized or eliminated, or at least that it is compensated. On
the other hand, it might be more efficient for the state whose
interests are impaired less to apply its law, and compensate the
other state.
1.

Predictability and Administrability Versus Accuracy

Comparative impairment would seem to suffer from the same
defect regarding predictability as interest analysis and the better
law approach; it requires a judicial analysis of the outcome that a
private person would have trouble predicting. 17 9 It would raise
greater problems in terms of administrability, requiring not just
that the judge divine the legislature's policy, but also that the
judge analyze each competing jurisdiction's policy and determine
the degree of impairment of that policy. Professor Weintraub has
stated that, "Unless supplemented by specific objective criteria,
.comparative impairment' is unlikely to be a method that is
cogent, feasible to administer, and predictable." Weintraub argues that empirical data is needed in order to determine comparative impairment. 18 0 He recognizes that some types of cases
might be more conducive to a comparative impairment approach,
such as cases in which empirical data is available, and cases of
nearly false conflicts, in which one state's policy is only slightly
implicated or one state repeals its law. 18 1 Baxter argues that
comparative impairment is more predictable than Currie's forumdefault option because comparative impairment is less subject to
forum shopping. 18 2 He also argues that the gains from the use of
comparative impairment "in effectuation of local policies will more
than offset the costs incurred by marginal reduction of primary
18 3
predictability."
Professor Brilmayer criticizes comparative impairment,
arguing that in order to achieve administrability, this method

must narrow the range of interests that it considers: "Baxter's
system offers clear guidance only by narrowing the range of

179. See FOUNDATIONS, supra note 47, at 146-47.

180. WEINTRAUB, supra note 86,at 338 (discussing Bernhard v. Harral's Club,
546 P.2d 719 (Cal. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 859 (1976)).

See also Herma H.

Kay, The Use of ComparativeInpairmentto Resolve True Conflicts: An Evaluation of
the CalyornlaExperience, 68 CAL. L. REv. 577 (1980).
181. WEINTRAUB, supranote 86, at 339.
182. Baxter, supra note 14, at 21.
183. Id. at 22.
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things states are entitled to want."18 4 Brilmayer finds that the
range of interests Baxter is willing to consider is narrow because
it refers to Currie's range of interests, which Brilmayer believes is
confined to substantive policies and does not extend to what one
might term "multistate policies." 18 5 As noted above with respect
to Currie's interest analysis, this may be in part an attack on a
straw man.1 8 6 In fact, one might argue that Baxter's comparative
impairment system is established to give content to the term
"multistate policies,"
by establishing
a
multflateralist
methodology for determining the circumstances under which

domestic substantive policies
should be subordinated to foreign
18 7

substantive policies.
The difficulty that Brilmayer identifies with Baxter's
approach is a real one, but it does not necessarily require
restrictive assumptions for its resolution. Rather, the same type
of metric that may allow varying policies of a single state to be
weighed accurately against one another also allows policies of
multiple states to be weighed against one another.
2.

Unilateralism Versus Multilateralism

Baxter argues for the application of norms beyond those of
the "internal" or substantive laws of the competing jurisdictions.
The normative principle he proposes "is to subordinate, in the
particular case, the external objective [the objective to apply
internal substantive policy to a multistate transaction] of the
state whose internal objective will be least impaired in general
scope and impact by subordination . . .188
This approach
reflects the incorporation of multistate values to address true
conflicts.

184. FOUNDATIONS, supra note 47, at 147.

185. Id. at 70-76.
186. See supra text accompanying notes 124-31.
187. Brilmayer has a more penetrating criticism of the predictability and
administrability of comparative impairment, which is also applicable to this

Article's proposal:
If a theory were genuinely accepting of all manner of interests and permitted states to attach whatever weight to those interests that they choose.
then when the time came to estimate the extent to which interests are
likely to be impaired no hard and fast assumptions could be made about

the extent to which a state is concerned about a particular case ....
Absent such restrictive assumptions, however, we can offer no guidance in
advance, but only subject the case to ad hoc judicial decisionmaking.
FOUNDATIONS,

supra note 47, at 147. See also lnfra text accompanying notes 315-

17.
188. Baxter, supra note 14, at 18.
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Comparative impairment is thus multilateral in its
perspective, taking the selfless view that the jurisdiction risking
the greatest impairment of its policy should be allocated
prescriptive jurisdiction. Comparative impairment is, in a sense,
the height of liberalism in conflict of laws, as it declines to
evaluate the quality of the potentially applicable laws, but merely
measures the extent to which their policies are frustrated. This
outcome is appropriate, given Baxter's expository method, using a
hypothetical negotiation between legislators of two Jurisdictions.1 8 9 At some point, however, negotiators determine
that they have a community of interests; it then may become
evident that the quality of their potentially applicable laws is
worth collective evaluation. It is at this point that perhaps the
better law factor, or Juenger's substantive approach, might
become viable. The proposal of this Article goes beyond Baxter's

approach by indirectly allowing consideration of the quality, or at
least the relative efficiency, of different jurisdictions' laws. 190
Half of Baxter's article setting forth the comparative impairment theory is devoted to an argument that, in the United States
domestic conflicts system, these issues should be addressed by
federal courts, rather than state courts. 19 1 Baxter's is an argument for multilateralism in the decisionmaking institution.
3.

Courts Versus Legislatures

The comparative impairment theory puts a great responsibility on courts to identify policies, as in Currie's interest
analysis, and in addition asks them to determine the comparative
extent of their potential impairment. This is the price that
comparative impairment pays to be able to address cases of true
conflicts. Baxter defends his assignment of this task to courts:
"The objection that courts are not equipped to discover the facts
upon which resolution must turn is equally applicable to a very

189. Id. at 7-17.
190. See Infra text accompanying notes 301-17.
191. Baxter's argument is as follows:
The courts of each state are active participants in the formulation and implementation of local policies. To place in their hands extensive responsibility for deciding when those policies will yield to and when they will

prevail over the competing policies of sister states seems unsound.
Baseball's place as the favorite United States pastime would not long
survive if the responsibilities of the umpire were transferred to the first
team member who managed to rule on a disputed event.

Baxter, supra note 14, at 23.
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large percentage of our judge-made rules of law." 19 2 With respect

to the argument that assignment of comparative impairment
tasks to courts is antidemocratic, Baxter correctly points out,
"This argument is irrelevant to the situation of a court required to
decide cases not covered by legislative choice rules, the situation
193
most frequent in this area."
A regime of federal choice of law rules administered by
federal courts would make sense; 194 however, it also would
appear that, if the decision must be made locally, administration
by the political branches might have some advantages. One
advantage is that political branches are in a position to negotiate
with other jurisdictions, whereas courts rarely do so. Another is
that for courts, choice of law decisions have a strong characteristic of ex post, single-play games. Courts only see conflicts
cases after the facts are known. Generally, courts will not deal
with these cases on anything approaching a continuous or
regular basis. On the other hand, a legislature may make conflicts rules generally and in advance, and it may negotiate, or
order the executive branch to negotiate, with other governments
in a horizontal system.
B. Early Applications of Law and Economics
In his book Economic Analysis of Law, Judge Posner briefly

criticizes interest analysis, arguing that "the issue ought not to be
interests; it ought to be which state's law makes the best 'fit' with
the circumstances of the dispute." 95 This initially might be
viewed as a variant of, and an improvement on,* the better law
approach: Which is the best law under the circumstances?
However, both in his book and in a judicial opinion, Judge Posner
asserts that the lex loci delicti' 96 approach to conflict of laws in
tort will ordinarily provide the best fit.' 97 This assertion contains

192. Icl. at 21.
193. Id. at 22.
194. See, e.g., Gottesman, supranote 47.
195. ECONOMIC ANALYSIS, supranote 23, at 587.
196. "Lex loci dellctil" is the method of choice of law for tort associated with the
vested rights theory. See supra text accompanying notes 80-96.
197. Kaczmarek v. Allied Chem. Corp., 836 F.2d 1055, 1058 (7th Cir. 1987).
One might note that Judge Posner has also written approvingly of Baxter's
comparative impairment approach. THE FEDERAL COURTS, supra note 23, at 30506. One might argue, on this basis, that Judge Posner has been inconsistent.
However, a broad law and economics approach to conflict of laws might reconcile

these varying perspectives. This Article seeks to provide such an approach. One
should note that Judge Posner is not "fully persuaded" by the comparative im-
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an implicit assumption that the law with the best fit should be
applied. Combining this assertion and assumption, and making
explicit an implicit assumption, we might arrive at the proposition
that, taking into account transaction costs-including the cost of
determining which law actually provides the best fit-the most
efficient way to seek the best fit in tort (even if it is not always
successful) is simply to refer to lex loci delicti.1 9 8 This proposition
implicitly accepts that lex loc delicti will not always indicate the
law with the best fit, but holds that it nevertheless is the best rule
to apply.
1.

Predictability and Administrability Versus Accuracy

If the best fit is to be sacrificed, it must be for other savings.
Those savings presumably are derived in the form of reduction of
judicial system transaction costs and judicial error.1 9 9

pairment analysis, as he is concerned that the impairment of each state will
cancel out the impairment of the other. Id.

198. Earlier in his book, Judge Posner characterizes the object of a procedural
system, in which he includes conflict of laws, as minimizing the sum of (a) the
cost Incurred as a result of erroneous judicial decisions, and (b) the cost of
operating the procedural system. ECONOMIC ANALYSIs, supra note 23, at 549.
199. Id.
In Kaczmarek v. Allied Chem. Corp., Posner criticizes interest

balancing:

The opponents of mechanical rules of conflict of laws may have given
too little weight to the virtues of simplicity. The new, flexible standards,
such as "interest analysis," have caused pervasive uncertainty, higher cost
of litigation, more forum shopping (a court has a natural inclination to apply the law it is most familiar with - the forum's law - and will find it easier
to go with this inclination if the conflict of laws rules are uncertain), and
an uncritical drift in favor of plaintiffs.
836 F.2d at 1057 (citing Lea Brilmayer, Governmental Interest Analysis: A House
Without Foundations, 46 Omo ST. L.J. 459 (1985). and Lea Brilmayer, Interest
Analysis and the Myth of Legislative Intent, 78 MICH. L. REV. 392 (1980).
In his 1985 book, Posner establishes the following equation:
The basic tradeoff is between the costs of information (of which the
major cost in this context is the reduction in the deterrent effect of the law)
that are created by uncertainty as to which state's law will govern a
particular dispute, and the costs of applying to the dispute the law of a
state that does not have the comparative advantage in resolving the
dispute most efficiently.
THE FEDERAL COURTS,

supra note 23, at 307.

With some license, we might equate this with the tradeoff described above
between predictability and administrability, on the one hand, and accuracy on the
other.
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Referring to this Article's hypothetical example of the United
States auto manufacturer exporting to Dystopia, one would have
to consider which law provides the best fit: United States law or
Dystopian law. One might be able to convince Judge Posner that
the United States liability standard is the best fit, as it results in
a uniform standard of responsibility for the manufacturer. On
the other hand, one might not, if by best fit Judge Posner means
the best rule for the relevant society. Judge Posner, however, has
not shown how to select the relevant society or the best fit; this
is the work of conflict of laws.
Moreover, the best fit must be determined with the interests
of all jurisdictions in mind, not just those of a single
Jurisdiction. 20 0 What if the best fit is truly achieved by splitting
responsibility among multiple jurisdictions?
Thus, it is not
enough to say, as Posner does, that the jurisdiction with the
comparative advantage in regulating the particular conduct
should be allocated jurisdiction. Even if the United States has
the comparative advantage in regulating automobile safety, it may
have incentives to regulate in a manner that causes negative
externalities, or declines to provide positive externalities, to the
constituents 20 1 of Dystopia. It is inadequate to say that Dystopia
must suffer these externalities in silence.
The next issue is that of transaction costs: the values of
predictability and administrabllty. Here, the concern is not with
determining the best fit, but with the costs related to finding the
best fit, and the costs incurred as a result of uncertainty about
the best fit. Given the complexity of the answer to the best fit
question, the costs of reaching it may be high, both ex ante
(predictability) and ex post (administrability).
The costs are

related to the facts:

some circumstances will be easier to

evaluate for best fit; some will be more difficult.

Certainty may

200. I assert this point conclusively here, but it represents a dificult
Judgment that others would reject in favor of a unilateral approach to conflict of
laws. See Infra text accompanying notes 239-63. I do not dwell on this issue, as
Posner seems to agree with the multilateral approach, but feels it appropriate to
allocate Jurisdiction unilaterally-to a single jurisdiction-despite the fact that
other jurisdictions are affected.
201. I am attempting for the moment to avoid words like citizen, resident, or
domiciliary, as these terms are formal and not necessarily substantively related to
the interests of the related Jurisdiction. The appropriate relationship to refer to Is
"members of the community." However, this begs the question, at least in part, as

any particular person is a member of many communities. I would resolve this
circularity by defining the membership in the community by reference to the
purposes of the community. Thus, if a person is a member of a bar association, it
has Jurisdiction over that person with respect to bar membership, most types of
legal ethics matters, and, unfortunately, dues. For now, I uses the nonlegal term,

"constituent", imprecisely, to convey this concept.
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provide greater rewards in some areas than in others. It is often
argued, for example, that people do not plan unintentional
torts. 20 2 To the limited extent that this is true, 20 3 predictability is

unimportant, but certainty or administrability is useful to
promote settlement and reduce judicial workload. Moreover, in
doctrinal areas in which intent is required to constitute the
offense or incur liability, predictability is more useful.
In order to analyze the connection between information or
uncertainty costs in Posner's equation and the diad of accuracy
versus predictability and administrabflity, it is necessary to
address another question regarding Posner's approach: Why is it
that Posner infers that the lex loci delicti would ordinarily provide
the best fit? 20 4 Posner argues that "the tort law of the state
where the accident occurs is likely to be the law most closely
attuned to the conditions in the state affecting safety, such as
climate, terrain, and attitudes toward safety."20 5 This may be an
appropriate way to look at a particular litigated case from an ex
post standpoint. Perhaps from an ex ante standpoint, Posner
would also assume that when the harm occurs in the situs, it is
felt in the situs. The fact that effects are felt in the situs would be
expected to provide a stimulus for the government of the situs to
provide rules that address the effect efficiently, assuming that the
cause also originates in the situs. 20 6 The government may or
may not respond to this stimulus, but this is presumably why
Posner expects the lex loci delicti rule to provide the best fit. As is

obvious, however, Posner is approximating in order to reduce
transaction costs. Two types of transaction costs seem most
relevant. First, it is difficult after litigation arises for a judge to
assess exactly which legal system provides the best fit (the
problem of administrability).
Second, it is difficult in a
counselling context, before litigation arises, for a lawyer or
businessman to determine the best fit, the law that will apply, to
20 7
guide his conduct (the problem of predictability).

202. Solmine, supra note 23, at 65.
203. See Infra note 207.
204. Posner is referring to tort cases; other types of cases might have other
references for "best fit". Indeed, it might be argued that lex loci delicti Is only
appropriate for certain types of torts. See Solimine, supra note 23, at 65.
205. Kaczmarek v. Allied Chem. Corp., 836 F.2d 1055, 1058 (7th Cir. 1987).
206. If the cause originates elsewhere, there might be little Inhibition on the
government In the situs over-regulating the conduct that constitutes the cause.
See Hay, supra note 26, at 617.
207. See Baxter, supra note 14, at 3. Posner argues that the largest part of
the transaction costs associated with conflict of laws relates to the ineffectiveness
of the deterrent effect of the law because of uncertainty as to its application. See
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The lex loci delictl rule may diminish these transaction costs,
possibly at the expense of reduced accuracy of decision, by
selecting the state whose law provides the best fit. Conversely,
interest analysis and balancing tests may reduce certainty at
each stage, and therefore increase transaction costs, while
possibly providing a better chance of achieving the best fit.
2.

Unilateralism Versus Multilateralism

Professor Solimine likes the territorial aspect of Posner's lex
loci delicti preference. 20 8 Solimine finds, perhaps eliding some of
the implicit subtlety of Posner's brief and unsystematic treatment
of this topic, that Posner's approach supports a lex loci delicti
rule; but Solimine seeks to explain why this efficient rule20 9 has
not been adopted by a majority of states. Solimine examines
competition in regulation-the economics of federalism-and
Interest group politics as sources of explanatory theories. 2 10
Economics of federalism examines the quality of competition
among Jurisdictions: whether it promotes a problematic race to
the bottom or a beneficial race to efficiency. 2 1 '
Solimine
considers conflict of laws in tort and finds that there are two
methods of competition, one for substantive law and one for
choice of law.
In the substantive law arena, the assumption is made that
the state wishes to enrich its plaintiffs and protect its

Posner's quotation from THE FEDERAL COURTS, supra note 199. While one accepts
that this is one of many types of transaction cost, It is difficult to understand why
this would generally be larger than, for example, the effect of causing people to
comply with law that should be inapplicable as it does not provide the "best fit."
One might accept Posner's statement if it referred to "the inaccurate imposition of

deterrent effect" instead of "the reduction of the deterrent effect." Solimine argues
that, combined with liberal choice of forum rules, conflict of laws uncertainty may
actually enhance deterrence. Solimine, supra note 23, at 64. Solimine continues
to point out that there is a real question regarding the "deterrent effect of law in
general and tort law in particular." Id. The argument makes sense on its face,

based on the proposition that people do not plan unintentional torts. However, a
quick look at "Corporate America" shows that standards of care and diligence
followed by corporations are mightily influenced by concern regarding tort liability,

or at least by the concerns of liability insurers who absorb tort liability.
208. However, he criticizes Posner's analysis on several grounds, some of

which are noted above. See supra text accompanying notes 202, 207.
209. See supranote 54.
210. Solimine, supra note 23, at 68-74. I consider here only the economics of
federalism theory.
211. See, e.g., Trachtman, supra note 26; McConnell, supra note 26; David A.
Rice, Product Quality Laws and the Economics of Federaltsm, 65 B.U.L. REV. 1
(1985).
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defendants. 2 12 In the United States federal system, a collective
action or free rider problem arises. Each state may adopt proplaintiff substantive law that, by virtue of liberal rules of personal
jurisdiction
allowing
for
forum
shopping, 2 13
imposes
disproportionate costs on external defendants. 2 14 This strategy is
supported by pro-plaintiff conflict of laws rules, which would
allow the application of forum law in these multistate cases.
Recall that the lex loci delicti rule would not contain a pro-forum
bias, whereas Currie's interest analysis and other formulations
would contain this bias. This is why Solimine finds that "a
decidedly imperfect market of competition among states could
2 15
explain the race to reject traditional choice of law rules."
Solimine supports this hypothesis with an empirical study,
concluding that "resident plaintiffs are favored under modern
choice of law theories, and are not favored under the lex loci approach."2 16
On this basis, Solimine endorses McConnell's
preliminary proposal for a federal conflict of laws rule in tort,
which would apply the law of the place of sale of the product to a

consumer. 217 This would be a relatively multilateralist solution,
providing some of the benefits of lex loci, but developed based on
a different perspective from that of vested rights theory.
McConnell proposes the implementation of a federal conflict
of laws rule applying the law of the place of sale as a means to
impose discipline on state substantive product liability law. The
problem he sees involves the discontinuity between a segmented
legal system and an integrated product market. Manufacturers
are subject to varying liability systems in each state, but are not
able to price their products-or indeed to avoid having their
products flow to certain states-to reflect these liability

212. These assumptions may be subject to qualifications regarding the
possibility of cooperation.

See ROBERT AXELROD, THE EVOLUTION OF COOPERATION

(1984); Larry B. Kramer, Rethining Choice ofLaw, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 277, 339-44
n.227 (1990); Note. To Form a More Pefect Union?: Federalism and Informal
Interstate Cooperation, 102 HARV. L. REV. 842 (1989).
213. See, e.g., Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 465 U.S. 770 (1984).
214. See McConnell, supra note 26.
215. Solimine, supra note 23, at 71-72. Solimine also finds that "[slimilar
conclusions can be extrapolated from an interest group theory of litigation." Id. at
72. However, this part of his analysis is beyond the scope of this Article.
216. Id. at 88-89.
217. Id. at 89-90 nn.173-74 (citing McConnell, supra note 26, at 97-100)
(arguing for uniform conflicts rule); P. John Kozyris, Choice of Law for Products
Liability: Whither Ohio?, 48 OIno ST. L.J. 377, 383-84 (1987) (arguing for reference

to law of place of sale).
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systems. 2 18 This inability to price accurately 21 9 makes it possible
for states to externalize costs by establishing pro-plaintiff product

liability laws. These laws enrich local plaintiffs at the expense of
2 20
disproportionately external manufacturers.
If a federal rule could be constructed that would force states
to internalize the costs resulting from their law (a condition of

autarky), according to law and economics theory, the states
would arrive at optimal, or at least better, product liability
laws. 2 2 1 Thus, as the title of this Article indicates, more accurate

conflict of law rules may give rise to more accurate allocation of
government responsibility and therefore more efficient government.

Although he recognizes that his proposed rule would "fall
short of perfect neutrality in state incentives," McConnell argues
that the rule would eliminate "law shopping"2 22 and thus

diminish incentives for forum shopping.

This, in turn, would

allow more accurate planning and pricing by producers and
create modest incentives for more optimal-anticipated to be less
pro-plaintiff-product liability laws. 2 23
Bruce Hay provides a careful critique of McConnell's methodology and conclusions, focusing on the motivations of states to
establish either lex loci delicti or interest analysis conflict of laws
rules for product liability. 2 24 His analysis indicates that the
phenomenon that McConnell observes-pro-plaintiff choice of law

218. They are unable to do so largely because of the possibility of parallel
importation: If goods are sold more cheaply in a state with a pro-defendant
product liability system, people will buy them there for resale in states with proplaintiff product liability systems. In addition, the Robinson-Patman Act, 15
U.S.C. § 13(a) (1988). may restrict this type of pricing as a form of price discrimination. See Rice, supra note 211, at 5.
219. In this regard, law is a product of governments (the government
establishes its product liability law). The price of the product-the costs that it
Imposes--could be established and imposed on the appropriate persons (those the
law protects). However, the need for a single national market makes it unacceptable to allow firms to engage in. or to enforce through limitations on resale,
differential pricing.
220. McConnell assumes that most, or at least a disproportionately large
number of, product liability suits will be between a local plaintiff and an external
defendant.
221. McConnell, supra note 26, at 98-99. The proposal advanced by this
Article Is that conflict of laws rules can be reformulated to approximate autarky
more closely.
222. I use this term to describe a phenomenon noted by Hay: the use of
forum shopping in order to take advantage of the forum's substantive law or
conflict of laws rules. Indeed, law shopping is the major incentive for forum
shopping.
223. McConnell, supra note 26. at 99.
224. Hay, supranote 26, at 617.

1994]

CONFLICT OFLAWS

1029

rules in product liability-provide incentives for, and result in,
state substantive product liability laws that are not pro-plaintiff.
Thus, he argues that liberal conflict of laws rules do not promote
a pro-plaintiff race to the bottom; on the contrary, they make it
possible for each state to have the benefit of pro-plaintiff substantive law without actually prescribing it.
Thus, states
possessing relatively lenient liability laws prefer to adopt a proplaintiff 'governmental interest' rule in place of a traditional
territorial rule. These states are motivated to make this change,
because this adoption allows domestic consumers to reap the
benefits from other states' relatively stringent laws, without the
225
increasing liabilty exposure of domestic manufacturers.
Therefore, "one cannot say a priori that manufacturer
liability in a decentralized product liability system is higher than
states would collectively prefer; it may be lower." 22 6 Hay reaches
this result by recognizing an additional motivation for states:
attraction and retention of investment. 2 2 7
This motivation
operates differently under a lex loci delicti regime than under
certain types of interest analysis. Under lex loci delicti, the
domicile of the manufacturer is viewed as irrelevant and thus is
not affected by the relative stringency of the domicile's product
liability rules. By contrast, under interest analysis the domicile
of the manufacturer could be relevant in cases in which the
plaintiff is domiciled elsewhere. Thus, onerous product liability
rules might be applicable to the manufacturer by virtue of its
domicile in a jurisdiction where these rules are in effect. This has
two potential consequences. First, manufacturers increasingly
might leave or avoid establishment in the jurisdiction. Second,
such departures or potential departures might motivate the
jurisdiction's legislators to reduce the stringency of their product
liability regime. Hay envisions the possibility of a race to the
bottom in reducing liability standards; he concludes that "[t]he
most one can say with confidence is that the governmental

225. Id. at 621.
226. Id. at 618. Hay's criticism of McConnell's proposal is based on the idea

that complete conflict of laws predictability, allowing the consumer and the
producer by virtue of their behavior to select the standard of liability, is somewhat
analogous to a repeal of tort law: it leaves standards of liability more or less to
contract. See also Trachtman, supra note 26. at 67, in which the author notes
that the problem with regulatory arbitrage is that the protected parties can police
neither the substantive conduct of the regulated persons nor the choice of
governing law by virtue of the behavior of the regulated person. Thus, in cases
where manipulable (externalization-permitting) conflict of law rules apply, the
effectiveness of regulation may be diminished.
227. Hay, supra note 26, at 627-32.
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interest rule, unlike the territorial rule, introduces a sharp

tension in the incentives states face in setting liability levels." 228
He notes that this competition would not arise under McConnell's
229
proposal.
The critical advance of Hay's analysis over McConnel's is
that Hay takes into specific account an additional side of the
regulatory competition phenomenon. In addition to considering
competition among states to favor local plaintiffs and to burden
foreign manufacturers, Hay considers competition among states
to attract and retain manufacturers. 23 0 He recognizes that, to the
extent that an interest analysis approach would make the
location of a manufacturer relevant for liability purposes, the
latter competition grows in importance. This recognition adds
complexity to the conflict of laws equation.
This Article's proposal recognizes and embraces this complexity, accepting the need for a multifactor, multiweight analysis.
In effect, the proposal accepts that the ability to provide greater
recoveries for resident plaintiffs, and the ability to reduce liability
of resident defendants, are the types of state policies that give

rise to the need for prescriptive jurisdiction.
IV.

THE PROPOSAL ARTICULATED 23 1

To more definitively develop the proposal, it is necessary to
begin by referring to foundational or normative principles. 2 3 2
However, the norms referred to are norms of governmental
legitimacy and federalism, not norms of substantive law. They
are meta-substantive in the sense that they are ordinately before
substantive law.2 33 Before one knows which substantive law to

228. Id. at 631-32.
229. Id. at 647 n.83.
230. Thus, law is a product with many customers. See Trachtman, supra
note 26, at 75-80.
231. This part of the Article seeks further to articulate the proposal, drawing
on the discussion in Parts I1 and IIH. The structure of this part is based on the
four diads that formed the analytical structure of Parts II and IHl. First, this part
shows the relationship between the Issues of private versus public interests and
unilateralism versus multilateralism.
Second, it addresses the relationship
between predictability and administrability, on the one hand, and accuracy on the
other hand.
232. See, e.g., Baxter, supra note 14, at 1; FoUNDATIONS. supra note 47, at 1.
233. This Is flatly inconsistent with Currie's thinking: "A choice-of-law rule
does express a policy, but it is not of the same order as the social and economic
policies which are normally developed by a state in the pursuit of its governmental
interests and the interests of its people." CURRm, supra note 1, at 52-53. Juenger
criticizes this statement:
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apply, one must know to which society or societies the relevant
persons or conduct belongs.2 4 Each of us, and each of our
transactions, belongs to multiple societies, organized both geographically and functionally.2 5
Each of these societies
comprises a bundle of relationships. The bundle may be large, as
in the case of United States citizenship, or it may be small, as in
the case of one's membership in a professional association or
one's visit to a particular foreign state during a vacation.
It is not circular to say that the decision of which society or
societies the relevant persons or conduct is located in and
accountable to--of which law is to govern-must take into
account the goals and purposes of the relevant societies. Currie
was correct about this, and Brilmayer is incorrect in her
criticism. 2a

6

The point is to look at the goal of the community for

two purposes.

First, what is the social contract between the

person to whom the law is sought to be applied and the community seeking to apply it? Second, to what extent, regardless of
any social contract, are the person's activities impeding the
ability of the community to achieve its purposes? Each is relevant, and the latter consideration may be a basis for application
2 7
of law without the former. 3

That passage, unsupported by authority, contradicts a record compiled
over centuries by courts, scholars and legislatures. It also flies in the face
of worldwide agreement on the need for conflicts law and express
Congressional policy. Finally, it clashes with the rationale of two landmark
decisions in which the Supreme Court emphasized the need for worldwide
comity, even at the expense of local policies. As the Justices pointed out,
multistate transactions involve policies and considerations quite different
from those that control purely domestic disputes.
Friedrich K. Juenger, Conflict of Laws: A Critique of InterestAnalysis, 32 AM. J.
COMP. L. 1. 37 (1984) (citations omitted) (citing. inter alla, Scherk v. Alberto Culver
Co., 417 U.S. 506 (1974); The Bremen v. Zapata Offshore Co., 407 U.S. 1 (1972)).
234. By this reference. I mean something much broader than narrowlyconceived territoriality-I mean effects on the relevant society in the broadest
sense. See Luther L. McDougal Ill, Comprehensive Interest Analysts Versus
Reformulated Governmental InterestAnalysts: An AppraisalIn the Context of Choiceof-Law Problems Concerning Contributory and ComparativeNegligence, 26 UCLA L.
REV. 439, 451 (1979).
235 "If human society were so organized that all aspects of life flowed within
coextensive spheres the problems studied in this book could never arise." VON
MEHREN & TRAUTMAN, supra note 5, at 3.
236. FOUNDATIONS, supra note 47, at 74.
237. To show the appeal of this idea, we may refer to the domestic law Idea
that "your rights end at my nose"; we may extend this idea to hold that I have the
right to regulate your conduct where it affects my (as yet undefined) right to
construct my vision of the good life. Thus, one might argue that legislative
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So, while conflict of laws is meta-substantive, it uses substantive policy as data. It should seek to enable societies to
achieve their substantive policy goals as effectively as possible.
Just as domestic society should be structured to provide power
linked with responsibility to citizens, so intergovernmental
society--conflict of laws-should be structured to match the
power of societies with their responsibility.
A. Private Versus Public Interests; UnilateraltsmVersus
Multilateraltsm
Unilateralism alone seems unsatisfactory, and the formulas

devised so far for multilateralism-vested rights and comparative
impairment-seem insufficiently accurate or insufficiently
predictable and administrable. Perhaps more importantly is the
issue of motivation. Why should any forum act multilaterally?
The end-goal of conflict of laws-as of law more generally-is
the maximization of the welfare of the constituents of the relevant
society.23 8 If international conflict of laws rules are analogous to
constitutional law-describing the allocation of power horizontally
within a unitary order-the relevant society whose welfare these
rules must maximize is international society.239 Of course, there

is nothing quite comparable to a world constitution, and world
society is far more decentralized than, for example, the federal
society of the United States.
However, in addition to engaging in transactions in different
societies in a horizontal order, all persons belong to societies at
multiple vertical levels. At which vertical level should one
maximize? The answer to this question depends on the subject
matter involved, the potential gains from centralization, the
potential losses from centralization, and the degree of difference
or similarity in social preferences. 24 0 The answer to this question
is relevant in determining how to deal with conflicts problems.

authority is legitimated by two principles: social contract and social tort. Social
tort In this sense involves the circumstance in which one person diminishes the

ability of a community of other persons to achieve their social goals. Of course, as

with tort law more generally, it is necessary to define a duty in order to determine

whether a tort has been committed.
238. Welfare may be defined in both absolute and relative terms. It is critical
to the proposal that we develop some absolute measures for welfare. See Infra
text accompanying notes 283-319.
239. Similarly. United States domestic-interstate-conflict of laws rules

should maximize welfare for the United States.

240. For a sustained discussion of these issues, see Trachtman, supra note
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By simplifying the vertical world into three societal levels for the
moment-the private level, the domestic level, and the multistate
level-one may examine why this is so. The following analyzes
the conflicts goals of society, seen from the perspective of each of
these three levels.
At the multistate (multilateral) level, there are two goals: (1)
Multistate predictability and administrability, including values
such as mutual cooperation and system order (which might be
derived from predictability); and (2) Multistate accuracy: optimal
allocation of responsibility among states-maximizing the
simulation of autarky, and thereby minimizing externalization.
At the domestic (unilateral) societal level, there are five
conflicts goals. The first three categories relate to the multistate
system, and the last two categories relate to the domestic system
(applicable only if the domestic system is non-unitary): (1)
Multistate predictability and administrability; (2) Offensive in-

ternational externalization:

legislating and applying law when

possible in a manner designed to impose costs on outsiders
(either as defendants or as plaintiffs, or otherwise). 2 4 1 This goal
is inconsistent with the goals at the multistate level, and may in
particular cases be inconsistent with multistate predictability and
administrability; (3)
Defense against foreign international
externalization. This goal is consistent with the goals at the
multistate level; (4) Domestic predictability and administrability,
to the extent that the domestic system is non-unitary; and (5)
Domestic accuracy, again to the extent that the domestic system
is non-unitary.
At the private societal level, there are six conflicts goals.
Here, similarly, the first three categories relate to the multistate
system, and the last three categories (applicable only if the
domestic system is non-unitary) relate to the domestic system:
(1) Multistate predictability and administrability; (2) Offensive
international externalization. This goal, in particular cases, may
be inconsistent with multistate predictability and administrability; (3) Defense against foreign international externalization;
(4) Domestic predictability and administrability, to the extent
that the domestic system is non-unitary; (5) Offensive domestic
externalization, to the extent that the domestic system is nonunitary. This may be equated with application of the most
favorable law. Again, this goal, in particular cases, may be inconsistent with domestic predictability and administrabflity; and
(6) Defense against domestic externalization, to the extent that

241. Id. at 57.
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the domestic system is non-unitary. This may be equated with
avoiding the ability of opponents to obtain application of the law
most favorable to them.
Although there are some commonalities among the varying
societal levels, conflicts goals differ, depending upon the level at
which maximization is being sought. Thus, a unilateral approach
will differ from a multilateral approach. 24 2 This analysis also
highlights the difference between the private interests and public
interests perspectives.
One may analyze how these approaches might begin to
coincide, and how their coincidence might be facilitated. Thus,
one can view the private versus public interests diad as merely
the beginning of a continuum of vertical levels of analysis, each of
which provides a different perspective. However, to a certain
extent, each societal level incorporates the perspectives of the
levels below. 24 3 The critical area of difference is between the

interest in externalization from a unilateral or private perspective,
and the interest in accuracy from a multilateral perspective.
Thus, offensive externalization and defense against externali2 44
zation might offset one another.
This Article explores in more detail below how these three
societal levels relate to one another, how to determine the correct
level at which to maximize, and what the implications of the
answers to these questions are for the proposal's approach to the
public-private issue and the unilateral-multilateral issue.
1. Relating the Private-Public Interests Diad to the UnilateralMultilateral Diad
As noted above, one may consider the vertical spectrum of
levels of organization as a continuum, from the private level to
the domestic public level to the multistate level, with other levels
in between, below, and above these three. If an optimal conflict
of laws proposal is to optimize values, which level's values should
be optimized?

242. The above analysis does not include differences in substantive policy
goals.
243. See supra note 135.
244. While these factors might offset one another, providing a basis for

cooperation, it is important to recognize that one society might have a comparative
advantage in externalization, either because of the extensiveness of its regulation
or because of its economic hegemony more generally. The United States comes to
mind. Such comparative advantage might limit the incentives to cooperation. See

generally Trachtman, supra note 26, at 57.
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The Partial Congruence Between Private and Public Interests

The private-public distinction is inappropriate in the context
of conflict of laws, assuming it is valid in any context. 245 From a
law and economics perspective, the private sphere is the sphere
normally left to market ordering. 24 6 Thus, the private sphere, in
theory, absent transaction costs or market failures, needs no law.

However, it is generally agreed by even the most extreme law and
economics theorists that in practice, the private sphere needs law
to reduce transaction costs by facilitating the assignment of
stable property rights and rules of tort liability and contractual
247
responsibility.
Thus, public policy-values at the state level-would be
expected to incorporate certain values from the private level. As
described above, those expected to be incorporated include the
interests in multistate predictability and administrability. One
might also assume that other private interests would be
expressed in public policy, including those in offensive international externalization, defense against foreign international
externalization and defense against domestic externalization. Of
course, each of these interests must be integrated with one another (they already are informed by substantive values at the
state level) in order to forge public policy. However, public policy
would not be expected to incorporate private interests in offensive
domestic externalization, although public choice theory might
indicate that it would. It is in this sense that the public-private
distinction retains some validity.
On the other hand, while
conflict of laws-relating either to public law or private
law-should operate only at the public policy level, public policy
incorporates some values from the private level.

245. See supra text accompanying notes 75-78. On the public/private distinction more generally, see Randy E. Barnett, Foreword: FourSenses of the Public
Law-Private Law Distinction, 9 HARV. J.L. & PuB. POLy 267 (1986): Kenneth M.

Casebeer,

Toward A

Critical Jurisprudence-A First Step by Way

of the

PublIc-PrivateDIstinction In ConstitutionalLaw, 37 U. MIAMI L. REv. 379 (1983); Alan
Freeman & Elizabeth Mensch, The Public-PrivateDistinction in American Law and
Life, 36 BUFF. L. REv. 237 (1987); L. Harold Levinson, The PublicLaw/PrivateLaw
Distinction In the Courts, 57 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1579 (1989); John H. Merryman,
The PublicLaw-PrivateLaw Distinctionin Europeanand American Law, 17 J. PUB. L.
3 (1968); Roscoe Pound, Public Law and PrivateLaw. 24 CORNELL L.Q. 469 (1939).
246. See, e.g., CoAsE, supra note 26, at 37-47.
247. See, e.g., ECONOMIC ANALYsis, supra note 23. at 33-34, 90-91, 367-69.
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3. The Potential for Alignment Between Unilateral and
Multilateral Interests
Similarly, there is an overlap, but not exact congruence,
between the values at the domestic level and those at the
multistate level, between unilateralism and multilateralism.
Given the incongruence, how can one expect states to agree to
action at the multistate level (which is equivalent to cooperation)?
Game theory predicts that cooperation may occur in cases in
which there are some interests in common, despite the possibility

for individual gain from defection. The possibility of trading the
opportunity to externalize for protection from externalization
noted above 2 48 indicates a basis for cooperation.
Professor Brilmayer recently has advanced a game theoretic
approach to maximization of state interests. 2 49 This approach
analyzes the possibility of cooperative behavior. It shows that
unilateral consideration of forum substantive goals is inefficient,
frustrating the possibility of efficient cooperative behavior in a
multilateral mode. Brilmayer adopts a bifurcated approach. She
describes first a game theoretic approach to maximization of state
values, without making assumptions about what values are to be
protected. 2 50
Separately, she seeks to ground conflicts in
individual rights to be free of inappropriate government
25
interference. '
Brilmayer begins her discussion, designed to show how
cooperation arises,2 5 2 by suggesting that the reason few states
have adopted Currie's approach to true conflicts-default to
forum law-is that "states have much to gain if they can find a
way to pursue their interests cooperatively." 2 53 She adopts a
game theoretic approach to examine how cooperation might

248. See supra text accompanying notes 243-44.
249. FOUNDATIONS, supra note 47, at 145-89. See Professor Weinberg's
criticisms of these arguments in Louise Weinberg, Against Comity, 80 GEO. L.J. 53
(1991). See also Kramer. supra note 212, at 341; Note, To Form a More Perfect
Union?: Federalismand Informal Interstate Cooperaton,supranote 212, at 844-47.
250. FOUNDATIONS, supra note 47, at 145-89.

251. Id. at 191-230. Her rights-based approach will be referred to in connection with the discussion of the predictability and administrability versus
accuracy diad below. See infra text accompanying notes 268-79.
252. See generally, AXELROD, supra note 212; KENNETH OYE, COOPERATION
UNDER ANARCHY (1986).
253. FOUNDATIONS, supra note 47, at 155. Brilmayer is discussing cooperation
among states within the United States; it is not clear whether her views would
translate to international cooperation.
Obviously, the international system
contains more diversity in domestic substantive law, more diversity in approach to
conflicts of law, and probably more diversity with regard to extent of trading
relationships.
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proceed absent actual negotiations, associating the rise of
cooperation with comity and reciprocity. It is perhaps worth

noting that game theory may approximate actual negotiations. It
can assume that players develop a way of operating, and
implicitly communicating and agreeing, absent actual communications and agreement. Brilmayer would agree that actual
negotiations are preferable to this method, but despairs of their
realization. 25 4 On the other hand, she shows how conflict of laws
activities-enactment of relevant statutes and court decisions
determining which law to apply and how-constitute a means of
communication and at least unilateral commitment, if not a
means of formal agreement.
Brilmayer uses Baxter's technique of hypothetical
negotiations to show how states might behave when evaluating
the relative costs and benefits of cooperative conflict of laws
behavior. She asserts that because states would have different
degrees of interest in particular cases, cooperation in the form, in
effect, of horse-trading would be useful:
one state takes
2 55
jurisdiction over the cases more important to it and vice versa.
Brilmayer further points out that increased accuracy is in everyone's interests. The ability to reduce overbreadth and underinclusiveness indicates the existence of a plus-sum game. The
plus-sum aspect of the game provides incentives for
cooperation. 2 5 6 However, Brilmayer also notes the fact that
conflict of laws provides opportunities for states to take advantage of one another and thereby profit from lack of cooperation through externalization.
Brilmayer examines the theoretical possibilities for development of cooperation, based on either specific reciprocity or
institutionalization. She finds that specific reciprocity-a tit-fortat strategy of cooperating in response to cooperation-is
inadequate to the complexity of conflicts issues because it lacks

254. Id. In Part 5, the author discusses the range of institutional alternatives,
and how they might relate to one another. See Infra text accompanying notes
323-28.
255. Brilmayer relates this approach to both comparative impairment and
interest analysis, and recognizes that one problem with this approach is that it
does not begin with any initial claims over particular cases. (She does not use the
term "horse-trading".) Id. at 169-170. This latter point, although Brilmayer does
not explore it further in connection with her game theoretic approach, is critical:
Is there a set of initial property-type rights that one could establish in order to
initiate bargaining. The effects test provides a source of such "property" rights: If

certain conduct affects State A persons, then State A should be accorded some
right to regulate the conduct. See Infra text accompanying notes 280-319.
256. FOuNDATIoNs, supra note 47, at 177.

1038

VANDERBILT JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW

[Vol. 26:975

standards. Without some set of norms, or agreed guidelines,
there is little guidance about what reciprocity would mean and on

what basis it would occur. 257

Brilmayer turns, therefore, to

institutionalization as a source, not of norms, but of agreed rules
and means of identifying (and punishing) defection from these
rules. She believes that institutionalization provides a more
promising means of cooperation in light of the failure of reciprocity. Brilmayer does not posit how this institutionalization
would take place, although she considers some precedents for
institutionalization in the United States federal system, including
the adoption of uniform laws 258 and the American Law Institute's
25 9
Restatements of Conflicts.
Institutionalization of course is only useful to reduce the
transaction costs relating to the negotiation of rules and the
enforcement of rules.
Brilmayer is describing an issue of
priorities. It is useful to develop institutions that can facilitate the
establishment of rules and provide enforcement mechanisms, and
efforts should be turned this way, rather than toward
establishing rules without institutions.
4.

The Vertical Continuum of Interests

Game theory provides support for the idea that cooperation
may develop, based on the self-interested actions of states in a
multistate system. 2 60 Cooperation develops to the extent that
unilateral and multilateral perspectives are congruent, because at

257. Id. at 180-81. This problem is a transaction costs problem: it is too
difficult to define standards of behavior and enforce compliance with defined
standards, without negotiating the specifics of the standards, and creating an
institution to facilitate enforcement.

258, Brilmayer refers to the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act as an
illustration of "some of the advantages of assigning responsibilities to a detached
body with no adjudicative responsibilities and no allegiance to any particular
state." Id. at 183.
259. Among the interesting advantages of the Restatement technique
emphasized by Brilmayer Is the fact that "because the Restatements are comprehensive documents, they can cover a broad enough range of topics to link issues
on which some states stand to benefit with issues on which the others do." Id. at
185. Thus, transaction costs are reduced by establishing a wide enough forum so
that it encompasses issues of value to all participants. Interestingly, Brilmayer
criticizes the Restatement technique as applied in the Restatement (First)and
Restatement (Second), on the grounds that they sought to rely on a "single fundamental principle." Thus, Brilmayer argues for an eclectic approach in recognition
of the basic nature of conflict of laws as a compromise. Id. at 187. I support an
eclectic approach also, but one that is informed by the single fundamental
principle expressed here.
260. I address below the question of how and when cooperation may develop.
See Infra Part V.
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least some unilateral goals are best expressed in terms of
multilateral cooperation. In fact, one might argue that cooperation may make the unilateral and multilateral perspectives
more congruent. This is because the establishment of institutions-including conflict of laws rules to the extent appropriate,
means of resolving other conflict of laws problems, and methods
to limit defection 261--may have spillover effects in which states
recognize additional avenues of cooperation as appropriate to
address additional areas of externalization. 26 2 Therefore, from
the standpoint of interstate negotiations, the unilateral or
multilateral issue is, to some extent, a false issue. Multilateral

perspectives are taken for unilateral reasons.

The question

remains whether it makes sense to direct courts to view cases
from a unilateral or multilateral perspective. It is likely that this
question can be answered by negotiation. To the extent that
directing courts to adopt a multilateral perspective satisfies
unilateral goals, states will so direct, subject to issues of
competence regarding the ability of courts to apply a multilateral
perspective.
This subpart has indicated that the private or public diad
and the unilateral or multilateral diad have limited validity, and
should be viewed as sectors of a continuum of vertical cooperation. There is partial congruence among these vertical
levels of interests. In another article, it has been argued that the
level at which society should operate in respet of particular
functions-the level at which cooperation in regulation should
occur-will depend on a calculus of the benefits of cooperation
against the detriments of cooperation in each particular functional case. 2 63 The same is true of conflict of laws rules. It was

argued previously that it would always be efficient on this basis
to cooperate in the establishment of conflict of laws rules, as
accurate conflict of laws rules would provide efficient allocation of
regulatory jurisdiction. Despite this efficiency at the multilateral
level, it may be that cooperation would not occur, due to
disparities in distribution of: (a) the benefits of efficient allocation
of regulatory jurisdiction and; (b) the detriments of prevention of

261. This is a reference to the full range of enforcement and dispute
resolution institutions, including surveillance, reporting, mediation, arbitration,

adjudication, and enforcement.
262. See supra note 259.

See also Jacques Pelkmans, The Institutional

Economics of European Integration, In INTEGRATION THROUGH LAW: EUROPE AND THE
AMERICAN FEDERAL EXPERIENCE 318 (Cappelletti et al. eds., 1986).
263. Trachtman, supra note 26.
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offensive international externalization, and transaction costs in
the reallocation of these benefits and detriments.
B. PredictabilityandAdminlstrabllty Versus Accuracy
Recall that the proposal allocates prescriptive jurisdiction
over a subject matter to governments whose constituents are
affected by the subject matter pro rata in proportion to the
relative magnitude of such effects, as accurately as is merited
given transaction costs in allocation of prescriptive jurisdiction.2 6 4 Accuracy is the critical term in the proposal, and it is
aligned with effects on constituents of the government to be
accorded prescriptive jurisdiction. This subpart explains this
proposal and defends it from some anticipated criticisms.
The central and most problematic issue is the definition of
accuracy in choice of law. Defining accuracy requires delineating
the relationship of a person to a community.2 65 Even after a
definition for accuracy is developed, the task is still not complete;
a means by which to measure and compare levels of accuracy
must then be developed. Finally, once measuring accuracy
becomes possible, one must be able to determine how to value
predictability and administrabflity to establish a tradeoff between
accuracy and predictability and administrability.
The
determination of the appropriate tradeoff in turn will help to
determine the appropriate roles of courts and legislatures,
respectively, in making conflict of laws decisions. Thus, under
the reasoning of the proposal, the accuracy versus predictability
diad subsumes the courts versus legislatures diad.
1.

Defining Accuracy

The definition of accuracy in connection with conflict of laws
depends on the purpose of conflict of laws: What is it trying to
achieve? On what basis does it seek to allocate prescriptive
jurisdiction? There are two basic definitional approaches. The
first approach seeks to establish a human rights basis for conflict
of laws and to define accuracy in terms of protection of these

264. The predictability/administrability versus accuracy diad is a simplified
restatement of the proposal itself, insofar as (i) the multilateral versus unilateral
and private versus public diads relate more to the politics of implementation than

to efficiency, and (H)the courts versus legislatures diad is subsumed in predictabllity/admlnistrability versus accuracy.
265. See supra note 201.
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rights.2 6 6 The second approach seeks to establish a community
rights, or sovereignty-based, 2 67 foundation for conflict of laws and
to define accuracy in terms of protection of community rights. If
individual rights are expressed within community rights,
however, these bases may be merged. In this sense, accuracy
may be based on human rights, both as expressed in community
rights, and as articulated directly.
2.

The Centrality of Rights

Professor Brilmayer argues that rights analysis "only
establishes what Robert Nozick has called 'side constraints,'
namely principled limits, based on fairness, on what the state
may do."268 If this argument is correct, it sets a severe constraint
on the utility of rights-based analysis. This analysis cannot tell
one where to go, but only where not to go. Brilmayer also argues
that the rights that are relevant in rights analysis "are primarily
negative rights rather than positive rights-shields not swords.
By and large, they grant the right to be left alone."2 6 9 It' seems

correct that in the context of litigation alone-of deciding
particular cases-rights analysis cannot go much further than
negative side constraints.
However, it is worth considering
whether rights analysis can form a central basis for a broader
approach
to
discourse,
adjudication,
legislation,
and

intergovermmental negotiation regarding issues of prescriptive
scope. After all, if the search is for a normative basis for conflict
of laws, then rights analysis would seem a likely place to begin.
Brilmayer distinguishes consequentialist approaches to
rights in conflict of laws from deontological approaches, finding
that modern conflict of laws theory is consequentialist. Put
simply, consequentialist theories, like utilitarianism or law and
economics, seek to maximize some defined utility. Deontological
approaches, on the other hand, work from a notion of what is

266. This approach provides a partial rationale for the vested rights theory.

On the other hand, the vested rights theory is not the only possible rights-based
approach. In fact, Brilmayer shows that vested rights, while creating territorialitybased rights, is not grounded in a vision of human rights as such. FOUNDATIONS,
supra note 47, at 203, 207-10.
267. I hasten to note that this sovereignty-based approach assumes that
sovereignty has roots in human rights and aspirations, and is not intended to
support or depend on an arid a priori concept of sovereignty. For a discussion of
sovereignty in this context, see Trachtman, supra note 38, at 459.
268. FOUNDATIONS, supra note 47, at 194. I will not pursue in this Article the
issue of "side constraints" or constitutional type limitations based on fairness.
269. Id. at 195 (footnote omitted).
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right-from a theoretical perspective-and apply this notion
270
regardless of outcomes.
Brilmayer separates consequential from deontological
thinking, arguing that a rights-based approach focuses on
individual fairness: that "states are limited in their pursuit of the
common good at the expense of the individual." 271 This is why
rights analysis can only provide side limits. There is only a
limited category of individual rights to which one is willing to
accord peremptory effect. Beyond that, individual rights are
merely private interests, subject to the analysis in subpart A(1) of
Part IV. It is worth noting that Brilmayer assumes that the protection of rights cannot be accommodated in a consequentialist
perspective-incorporating principle into policy. By comparison,
law and economics theory would put a price-perhaps a high
one--on fairness or rights.27 2
Brilmayer finally rejects, or severely limits, the applicability
of law and economics theory and its consequentialist approach to
conflict of laws. She does so regardless of the merits of consequentialism more generally, 273 on the assumption that the forum
will act from a unilateral, not multilateral, perspective. 274 She
thus finds "normative difficulties in applying consequentialist
270. Brilmayer refers to the use of the term "policy" in writings by authors
such as Ronald Dworkin: "Adjudication based on 'principle" [deontological] Issaid

to effectuate

the parties' rights, and adjudication based

on 'policy'

[consequentialist] Is said to further collective social goals." Id. at 200 (citing
RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 90-100 (1976)).
271. Id. at 204.
272. See, e.g., ECONOMIC ANALYSIS, supra note 23. at 27. It might comport
with social preferences to place a high price on fairness, but It is seldom the case
that fairness is the only value to be considered in legislation or adjudication.
273. FOUNDATIONS, supra note 47. at 205:
If a local citizen challenges a consequentialist local rule on the grounds
that it unfairly sacrifices his or her rights to the common good, there may
at least be the response that the rule is a product of political processes in
which the individual has participated. In cases where one or both of the
litigants may hall from other states, this response may not be available.
The question then arises whether there is a legitimate basis to require the
individual's contribution.
Id.
Instead of responding to this question, Brilmayer rejects It,arguing that
consequentialism Is inappropriate for application to conflict of laws. Brilmayer
declines to accept the notion that if an individual frustrates the ability of a
community to achieve its goals, even if the individual is foreign to the community,
the community may act to stop the individual: that the individual's freedom stops
at the community's nose. I argue below that the effects of the individual's conduct
may yield a legitimate basis for his contribution. See Infra text accompanying
notes 283-319.
274. See supra text accompanying notes 249-63.
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reasoning in cases that transcend state borders" and requires a
showing "that the individual is properly subject to the state's
authority" before permitting the good of the individual to be
sacrificed for that of the state. 2 7 5 In this regard, Brilmayer
merely restates the conflict of laws problem: Which individuals
should be subjected to a particular state's authority?
She
eschews the possibility of finding justification for the state's
authority in the effects that the individual's conduct may have on
the state. This perspective is inconsistent with the proposal of
this Article, which focuses on effects as a basis for prescriptive

jurisdiction. Her perspective is based on the false notion that
each person is a member of, or is beholden to, only a single
community.
It is necessary to recognize that formal
politics-formal citizenship-is not the sole factor that relates
people to communities. This approach seeks to establish a
threshold fairness test as a source of side limits on governmental
power. Consequently, it fails to admit into its calculus all of the
complexity of modem society and the variety of ways that, and
degrees to which, the individual may influence the state and may
affect the ability of the state to realize its goals, and the variety of
ways that, and degrees to which, the state may affect the in2 76
dividual.

Brilmayer's concerns regarding the application of a jurisdiction's laws to a person not a part of that jurisdiction's political
process is an expression in political terms of the economic
concept of externalization. It is somewhat different, however, as
it focuses on lack of voice, rather than on lack of cost internalization. However, lack of voice is neither necessary nor
sufficient for externalization to occur. Political rights are insufficient to protect against externalization, so long as the dominant
voting group externalizes to the minority. Even those without a
voice may be able to protect themselves from externalization by
avoiding personal jurisdiction or seeking the diplomatic or
political espousal of a coordinate sovereign.
In addition,
Brilmayer considers domicile, consent, territoriality, and
mutuality (the availability of coordinate rights) as bases for
27 7
legitimacy.
It is necessary to agree with Brilmayer that rights are
relevant to conflict of laws and that political legitimacy is required
to support the application of a particular jurisdiction's law to a

275. FOUNDATIONS, supranote 47, at 206.
276. Id. at 227-29.
277. Id. at 210-27.
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particular individual. However, political legitimacy has a much
more complex source in a social contractarian consequentialism.
Furthermore, as Brilmayer recognizes, legitimacy of legislation is
not necessarily exclusive (that is, it may be legitimate for more
than one jurisdiction to purport to govern the same individual or
conduct). The argument of this Article is based on the different
perspective that fairness and rights are not substitutes for
consequentialism, but rather may be the results of
consequentialism. 2 78 This perspective is grounded on the same
observation as Brilmayer's rights-based approach: "that a state
must be able to justify the burdens that it imposes, as well as to
explain the benefits that it seeks to achieve, when it applies its
279

law."

C. The Ex Ante Importance of Effects: A Step Beyond Comparative
Impairment
In the Laker Airways case, Judge Wilkey made the following
statement by way of justifying the burden that the United States
persons by extraterritorially applying its antiimposes on28foreign
0
trust laws:

Certainly the doctrine of territorial sovereignty is not such an
artificial limit on the vindication of legitimate sovereign interests
that the injured state confronts the wrong side of a one-way glass,
powerless to counteract harmful effects originating outside its
boundaries which easily pierce its "sovereign" walls, while its own
regulatory efforts are reflected back in its face.
This argument is a consequentialist argument that a community's regulatory jurisdiction should be congruent with, or at
least sufficient to address, effects on the community. 2 8 1 The
argument has considerable theoretical appeal, despite considerable theoretical and practical problems.
In a world of truly private law in which the community has
no public interest other than administrability, perhaps predict278. This perspective does not entail a disregard for the essential dignity of
humanity, or for human rights. Rather, it entails skepticism about the ability to
construct fixed formulae by which to translate these concepts into conflict of laws
decisions.
279. Id. at 229.
280. Laker Airways Ltd. v. Sabena, Belgian World Airlines, 731 F.2d 909, 923
(D.C. Cir. 1984). See also Weinberg, supra note 249, at 71 nn. 95-97 and sources
cited therein.
281. Judge Wilkey recognizes some limits imposed on this concept by international law in the form of a requirement of reasonableness. He also sees a
requirement that the effects be intended. 731 F.2d at 923. The proposal would
not necessarily accept these qualifications on jurisdictional accuracy.
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ability, and the assertion of sovereignty, there are, by definition,
no relevant effects. 2 82 Thus, neither Wilkey's argument nor the
proposal of this Article would be applicable, and the vested rights
theory, or Brilmayer's rights-based approach, would make perfect
sense. Given, however, a world in which, as argued above, all law
is public, and all legal concerns are public law or regulatory
concerns, conflict of laws has nothing to take account of besides
effects on the community.
1.

Law as a Public Good
Communities are formed to share in the creation of public

goods 2 83 at various vertical levels and in various geographic and

functional horizontal relationships. Public goods are defined as
goods that are subject to neither exclusivity nor rivalry. That is,
once the good is created, any consumer may appropriate it, and
the consumption of it by one consumer does not diminish its
availability to others. 2 8 4 From the standpoint of public finance
economists, these characteristics are important because they
indicate that, due to collective action problems, government
should provide these services.
These public goods include
regulation that facilitates economic activity and protects against
domestic externalization. Activities or persons that reduce the
utility of these public goods to the community impose a cost on
the community. Conflict of laws becomes relevant when these

activities or persons relate to multiple communities.
Thus, we are dependent on a definition of "public good" in
order to provide a definition of "effects," on which to base
jurisdiction. It is necessary to include, in addition to positive
public goods, such as food and drug regulation or police services,
public goods that arise from laissez-faire-from the decision not
to regulate. 2 85 Thus, in calculating effects, one considers not just
reduced utility of positive public goods such as regulation, but
also reduced utility from the imposition of regulation in place of
laissez-faire.
To put this in interest analysis terms, or
comparative impairment terms, one must weigh not only the
positive policies of other governments, but also the negative

282. See supra text accompanying notes 245-47.
283. See generally RICHARD MUSGRAVE, THE THEORY OF PUBLIC FINANCE (1959).
284. Id.

285. This is really the same idea as that expressed above to the effect that
private interests in having the market work efficiently (in this case free of
regulation) may be incorporated in public policy. See supra text accompanying
notes 245-47.
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To put it in Coase's terms, "We are dealing with a

28 7
problem of a reciprocal nature."

2.

The Coase Theorem and Conflict of Laws

Viewing law as a public good-as the product of or even as a
factor of production owned by governments-provides an important analogy to the private sector. In the private sector, the law of
property rights determines the initial distribution of goods and
rights. In the intergovernmental sector, conflict of laws deter-

mines the initial distribution of power. 2 88

In both cases, the

Coase Theorem would indicate that, absent transaction costs,

this initial allocation of property rights would not have efficiency
ramifications. 28 9
The reason this initial allocation would, in
theory, not affect efficiency is that market participants would

engage in transactions resulting in efficient outcomes. Thus, in
the intergovernmental sector, if it is clear that the laws of State B
govern a particular transaction that imposes costs on State A,

State A may compensate State B to prohibit the transaction.
Coase further argues (perhaps somewhat inconsistently) that
"ifmarket transactions were costless, all that matters (questions
of equity apart) is that the rights of the various parties should be
29 0
well defined and the results of legal actions easy to forecast."

286. It might be better to term these the "apparently" negative or "relatively"
negative policies, as there is no necessary judgment that one is normatively
Inferior, or less considered, than the other.
287. COASE, supra note 26, at 96. This characteristic has been recognized by
the United States Supreme Court in the context of extraterritoriality. in a case
involving a fairly assertive "negative" French policy "Extraterritorial assertions of
Jurisdiction are not one-sided ....

The lesson of comity is that neither the

[United States discovery order nor the [French] blocking statute can have the
same omnipresent effect that it would have in a world of only one sovereign."
Socldtd Nationale Industrielle Adrospatiale v. United States Dist. Court, 482 U.S.
522. 545 n.29 (1987).
288. I refer here to familiar governmental powers, such as the power to tax,
the power to regulate, and the power to enforce these prescriptive powers. The
Restatement (Third) divides jurisdiction into three components: jurisdiction to
prescribe, jurisdiction to adjudicate, and jurisdiction to enforce. RESTATEMENT
(THIRD), supranote 76, § 401.
289. COASE, supra note 26, at 95-185 (reprinting and commenting on The
Problemof Social Cost, 3 J. LAW & ECON. 1 (1960)).
290. COASE, supra note 26, at 119. Indeed, even this may be too conservative
a position. In the absence of transaction costs, even property rights may be
unnecessary to be specified. Steven N.S. Cheung, Will China Go "Capltallst"?.
Hobart Paper No. 94 (1986). Thus, in a world without transaction costs, not only
is the firm unnecessary, but law, the state, and international law are also unnecessary. As Coase says, ii]t would not seem worthwhile to spend much time
investigating the properties of such a world." COASE, supra note 26, at 115.
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In the intergovernmental sector, this is an argument that the
specifics of the conflict of laws rules are irrelevant, so long as
their results are predictable and their application is
administrable. However, as Coase noted with respect to the
private sector, transaction costs exist. In fact, they may be

greater in the intergovermmental sector. In connection with the
private sector, Coase notes that legal decisions should be made
with a view to "reduce the need for market transactions and thus
29
reduce the employment of resources in carrying them out." '
Thus, conflict of laws rules in the intergovernmental sector
may be equated with property rights in the private sector: each
determines which decisionmaker initially controls the use of
factors of production. The goal of conflict of laws rules in this
context is to minimize transaction costs, in order to maximize the
extent to which transactions that may result in optimal allocation
of the factors of production of public goods occur.
Conflict of laws rules may achieve this goal in two ways.
First, conflict of laws rules may by their predictability, administrability, and transparency facilitate market transactions that
reallocate authority. In the intergovernmental sector, market
transactions are agreements allocating authority: treaties, constitutions, uniform laws, practices (such as comity),2 92 or other

means of circumscribing claims of authority. The extent to which
conflict of laws rules satisfy this condition amounts to
predictability in this context. Administrability and transparency
may be considered as incorporated into predictability.
Second, conflict of laws rules may provide starting positions-allocations of authority-that reduce transaction costs by
obviating the need to transact. The extent to which conflict of
laws rules provide such allocations amounts to accuracy in the
intergovernmental sector.
One may relate the first method-predictability-to the
prisoner's dilemma used by game theory. 29 3 If each prisoner is

291. Id. at 119. Coase stated: "The same approach which, with zero transaction costs, demonstrates that the allocation of resources remains the same
whatever the legal position, also shows that, with positive transaction costs, the
law plays a crucial role in determining how resources are used." Id. at 178.
Coase argues that with positive transaction costs, the "market transactions" by

which private action would reallocate resources may become too costly to effect.
Id.
292. I consider comity to be a method of communication, perhaps but not
necessarily including an element of reciprocity. See supra note 100.
293. For an explanation of the prisoner's dilemma, see R. DUNcAN LUCE &
HowARD RAIFFA, GAMES AND DECISIONS (1957). See also AXELROD, supra note 212,
at 27. Essentially, the prisoner's dilemma is a game theoretic Illustration of a cir-
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able to know what her comrade intends to do, and to bind her
comrade to cooperative action through a binding contract, the
negotiation of an optimal solution will be facilitated and the
prisoner's dilemma will be resolved. Thus, conflict of laws rules
that are predictable, administrable, and transparent will allow
State B to negotiate an exchange with State A, whereby State A
changes its rule of substantive law for application to a particular
class of transactions, and State B confers something of value on
State A.2 94 On the other hand, conflict of laws rules that are unpredictable or opaque because they are result-oriented
("substantive," using Juenger's terminology),2 95 or that depend on
an analysis of forum policy that has not yet been undertaken (as
in interest analysis absent the role of binding precedent), reduce
the ability of states to negotiate these exchanges.
The second method-accuracy-seeks to establish in
advance an allocation of authority that market participants-governments-would come to themselves in the absence
of transaction costs. It is thus a theoretical exercise that might, if
it were not for transaction costs, be subject to empirical testing
on the basis of whether the initial allocation of authority is
revised through subsequent negotiation. Under these circumstances, what theoretical allocation of authority is most likely to
be relatively stable? One might begin by seeking to assess what
2 96
allocations would be unstable.
First, as illustrated by Judge Wilkey's views above, an
allocation of authority is likely to be unstable if it fails to accord
authority to a government whose constituents are affected by the
circumstance in question. This is nothing less than the principle
that each community should have control over its own destiny
and be able to negotiate with other communities, or foreign individuals, 29 7 when their destinies collide. The term "affected"

cumstance in which each player's individual choices are less attractive in an

aggregate sense than cooperation; if the players fall to cooperate, their aggregate
welfare is diminished.
294. For example, if the United States and Brazil could agree that Brazil owes
no obligation to the United States to protect its rain forest, or its biodiversity,

negotiations could proceed with greater clarity, albeit to the greater cost of the
United States.
295. See supra text accompanying notes 155-57.
296. Baxter's methodology of hypothetical negotiations seems to be an

appropriate tool. See Baxter, supra note 14.
297. Here, recall Brilmayer's rights-based approach that would protect foreign
individuals from inappropriate exercises of prescriptive Jurisdiction. Perhaps one
reason that Brilmayer finds this protection necessary is that individuals, foreign
or domestic, are not often accorded the opportunity to negotiate with governments
over their regulation.

1994]

CONFLICT OF LAWS

1049

must be interpreted very broadly, to include not just the frustration of a positive governmental policy, but any harmful effects
that a constituent would pay to abate, including frustration of a
decision, or of a laissez-faire policy. One normally thinks of these
effects as externalities. Conversely, (and illustrating that this is,
in Coase's terms, a "problem of a reciprocal nature"), an
allocation of authority is likely to be unstable if it accords
authority to a government whose constituents are not affected, in
derogation from the authority of a government whose constituents are affected.2 9 8
Second, an allocation might be unstable if it allocates
authority to a government other than the one holding a comparative advantage in regulating the subject matter. These may
be first-mover advantages,2 99 that is, advantages due to greater
experience with the type of business or type of regulatory prob-

lem, or other advantages in regulating. 3°°
These potential components of instability would appear to
indicate that stability may be obtained by allocation based on a
calculus that considers effects and regulatory comparative
advantage. Allocation of authority on the basis of regulatory
comparative advantage, however, presents problems of moral
hazard 3 0 ' or agency costs. 30 2

The regulator with comparative

advantage will not have appropriate incentives to safeguard the
interests of other states. In addition, the determination of
comparative advantage is reminiscent of the determination of

298. This is Currie's disinterested third state problem. See Currie, supranote
42, at 754.
299. See Roberta Romano, Law as a Product- Some Pleces of the Incorporation
Puzzle, 1 J.L. EcoN. & ORG.225 (1985).
300. One example might be drawn from the perspective of the United States
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). In discussions of allocation of
regulatory authority, the SEC is extremely reluctant to cede authority to other
regulators. It might be argued that the SEC's position is supported by its leading
position and extensive experience in securities regulation, compared to that of
other securities regulators. For a discussion of the SEC's approach to allocation
of regulatory authority, see Recent Initiatives, supra note 19.
301 "Moral hazard arises when an individual has the ability to affect his loss
in some or all states by taking some 'discretionary' action." Richard Kihistrom &
Mark Pauly, The Role of Insurance In the Allocation of Risk, 61 AM. ECON. REv.
PAPERS AND PRoc. 371, 378 (1971). Another way of looking at moral hazard is as a
type of conflict of interest: the person in control of a decision bears less than all

of the consequences of the' decision.
302. Agency costs are the costs of avoiding conflicts of interest or moral
hazard. See, e.g., Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm:
ManagerialBehavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305,

308-10 (1976); Anthony Fama, Agency Problems and the Theory of the Firn, 88 J.
POL. ECON. 288 (1980).
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better law. It raises similar problems of institutional competence
and legitimacy.3 0 3 Therefore, it is provisionally deleted from the
list of considerations.3 0 4 The remaining basis for allocation of
authority is effects.
3.

The Role of Effects

There are two critical qualifications to the role of effects as a
basis for allocation of authority. First, a stable system would not,
like the comparative impairment approach, measure the effects
on each state and simply award plenary authority to the state
most affected.3 0 5 Greater complexity must be embraced in order
to avoid moral hazard, illegitimacy, and consequently, instability.
Accuracy will be enhanced by a kind of depegage3 0 6 (nouveau
depegage) that spreads authority, pro rata, to all governments
whose constituents are affected. 3 0 7 For those shaking their
heads incredulously at the administrative complexity and
apparent .folly of this notion,3 0 8 consider Judge Wilkey's per-

303. See supra text accompanying notes 143-68.
304. 1 return to regulatory comparative advantage below. See Infra text
accompanying note 319. It may be that regulatory comparative advantage
becomes a basis for allocating regulatory authority in certain areas. For example,
under the Basle Convention on Transboundary Movement of Hazardous Wastes,
only states with the ability to dispose properly of hazardous wastes are permitted
to be recipients of transboundary shipments of hazardous wastes.
Basel
Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes
and Their Disposal, openedfor signature Mar. 22, 1989, art. 4, para. 9(a), In 28
I.L.M. 657. Thus, a defined level of technological and regulatory competence, in a
circumstance that offers few opportunities to externalize costs, may be a basis for
allocating regulatory Jurisdiction in accordance with competence.
305. Of course, each of the conflict of laws systems discussed here, or
otherwise known to the author, would assign full authority to one or more
Jurisdictions, but would not Solomonically divide authority among jurisdictions.
306. Depegage is normally associated with the application of laws of different
states to resolve d!ferent issues in the same case. See, e.g., Willis L.M. Reese,
Depegage. A Common Phenomenon in Choice of Law, 73 COLUM. L. REV. 58 (1973).
Here, I use the term to refer to the application of laws of different states to resolve
the same issue in the same case.
307. Of course, this is the way shareholders vote in corporations and banks
vote in syndicates: each has control in proportion to the extent to which it is
affected. Share ownership and loan commitments measure both voting rights and
economic interests, ensuring that these are congruent.
308. The reader is properly concerned about administrability. I address this
issue below. See Infra text accompanying notes 322-37. The author thanks
Professor Weintraub for pointing out that he and Professor von Mehren have both
made a somewhat different, perhaps broader, "creative" proposal. Professor
Weintraub suggests that. in otherwise intractable circumstances, "lilt may be
possible to fashion a rule for the case in issue that differs in some respects from

the domestic law of either contact state but that permits the accommodation of
otherwise irreconcilable policies." WEINTRAUB, supra note 86, at 79. See also
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spective in the Laker Airways case. The United States should not
be prevented from asserting regulatory jurisdiction over conduct
that has adverse effects in the United States. One might go on to
say that other affected states should not be required to abdicate
authority simply because the United States asserts authority..
Shared effects indicate a need for shared authority.3 0 9
Second, the effects worth considering are not confined to
those implicated in any particular case or transaction. If these
effects were considered alone, the rule would be unstable, not to
mention unpredictable. The effects to be considered are not the
effects on a particular claimant, or even the effects of a particular
policy or its frustration, but the total social effects on the
constituents of the relevant state on a long-term basis.3 10 In
addition to considering effects on plaintiffs, it is necessary to
consider effects on defendants; in addition to considering the
positive effects of regulation, it is necessary to consider the
negative effects.
These effects should not be considered as limited to narrow
monetary loss or gain. Rather, they might be considered very
broadly to include problems of reciprocity, diminution of the
happiness of constituents through disrespect of the rights of
nonconstituents, or other concerns that might require consideration of rights.3 1 1 Thus, in a world without a priori definitions
of human rights, or even in a world with such definitions, but in
which human rights sometimes must be compromised for other
values, a consideration of aggregate effects may incorporate
human rights.3 12 However, the effects must be quantified in
order to provide a basis for accurate weighing.

Arthur T. von Mehren, Special Substantive Rules for MultistateProblems: Their Role
and Significance in ContemporaryChoice of Law Methodology, 88 HARV. L. REV. 347
(1974).

Professor von Mehren also suggests that, in certain cases, a "special

substantive rule" should be fashioned to accommodate competing governments'
interests. Id.
309. See, e.g., Charles M. Tiebout, A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures, 64 J.
POL. ECON. 416, 423 (1956) (indicating that where externalities are of sufficient
importance, "some form of integration may be indicated"); Trachtman, supra note 26,
at 71.
310. See Luther L. McDougal Ill, supra note 234, at 439; Alexander, supra
note 28.
311. See, e.g., John H. Ely, Choice of Law and the State's Interest In Protecting
its Own, 23 WM. & MARYL. REv. 173 (1981).
312. Even Brilmayer's rights-based approach recognizes that human rights
must sometimes be compromised; her concern is with the legitimacy of doing so
when the person whose rights are expropriated is not a part of the expropriating
community. FOUNDATIONS. supra note 47, at 205. Thus her concern may be
viewed as a concern for externalization, more than for rights on an a priori basis.
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It is necessary to address the problem of relativity of effects.
This can best be illustrated by the United States assertion of so-

called "extraterritorial"3 13 application of its law. Other states
argue that they refrain from such extraterritorial application; that
they do not seek to assert the wide applicability of their policies.
Other states may refrain from such application for two reasons.
First, they may not have as highly articulated a policy in fields
such as antitrust or securities. Second, they 3may
be more
14
reticent to apply their policies to multistate activity.

Assuming for a moment this disproportionate level of policy
and willingness to assert it in the international market, how can
it be fair to allow the United States, in effect, to rule the world?
There are two levels of response to this question. First, as noted
above, one must weigh not only the positive policies of other
governments, but also the.negative or laissez-faire policies. Thus,
under this approach, the interest of the United States in

regulating an international uranium cartel could be offset by the
interest of other states in maintaining an international uranium
cartel.
Second, while Brilmayer is correct that "no hard and fast assumptions can be made about the extent to which a state is
concerned about a particular case,"3 15 one may posit that a
state's legitimate interest may be measured in dollar terms. In
this way, the subjective question of the level of state concern is

rplaced by a more objective question:

What is the actual cost

that would be imposed if a state cannot regulate, or what is it
worth to the state to be able to regulate? Thus, the question is,

The proposal addresses the problem of externalization in a different way: not by
establishing barriers to the reach of the state, but by ensuring that the reach of
the state is congruent with the effect on the state.
313. As noted elsewhere, extraterritoriality has no agreed or obvious meaning.
One way to regard the concept of extraterritoriality is to view it broadly, as
Professor Brilmayer and Mr. Norchi have done: "As used here, a case involves
extraterritoriality when at least one relevant event occurs in another nation." Lea
Brilmayer & Charles Norchi, Federal Extraterritorialityand Fifth Amendment Due
Process, 105 HARv. L. REv. 1217, 1218 n.3 (1992). While this definition may be
extremely broad, it encompasses the extensive range of problems that conflict of
laws must address.
314. On the other hand, the European Community and Germany have active
antitrust laws, and apply their laws in ways that may be viewed as
"extraterritorial." See Joined Cases 89, 104, 114, 116, 117 & 125-29/85, A.
Ahlstrom Oaskeyhtio v. Commission, 1988 E.C.R. 5193, 4 Common Mkt. Rep.
(CCH) 14,491 (1988); James J. Friedberg, The Convergence of Law in an Era of
PoliticalIntegration: The Wood Pulp Case and the Alcoa Effects Doctrine, 52 U. PITT.
L. REV. 289 (1991); David J. Gerber, The ExtraterritorialApplication of the German
Antitrust Laws, 77 AM. J. INT'L L. 756 (1983).
315. FoUNDATIONS, supra note 47, at 147 (emphasis added).
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what are the comparative costs (comparative financial impairment) to State A and State B resulting from a decision to apply
the law of one or the other? As Professor Alexander proposes,
"when the actual effects on competing states of the application or
nonapplication of their rules can be assessed, these effects rather
than the rules' objectives should form the basis
for any findings
316
of 'interest' or comparisons of 'impairment.'"
The difficult question, of course, is how are these costs to be
calculated? In order to do so, it is necessary to posit a methodology for quantifying the effects of legal rules; the law and
economics school as a whole, and indeed economics as a separate

discipline, is concerned with this endeavor.3 17

Of course,

monetizing social preferences and incursions thereon is complex
and inexact. This is a frontier area of economics and of law and
economics. For some types of preferences, it is not terribly
difficult to determine a money value. There may be a parallel
private market, for example, for transportation services. For
other types of preferences, such as an unpolluted environment,
valuation may be much more difficult, although it is being
attempted. 3 18 It is correct to say that these efforts are primitive
and inexact; yet there seems litfle alternative.
Unless one
measures and compares impairment of policies, there can be no
principled negotiation of which state is to be accorded prescriptive jurisdiction.
Interestingly, quantification of the effects of legal rules would
incorporate, to a marginal extent, a law and economics-oriented
better law component. This is so because the state with the more
efficient rule of law would incur greater costs by virtue of the
application of a less efficient foreign rule. In this sense, one also
reincorporates the issue of comparative regulatory advantage as
3 19
part of the calculus of stability.
This analysis of a Coasean approach to conflict of laws has
thus replicated the predictability or accuracy diad, describing the
importance of predictability and accuracy. In fact, under this

316. Alexander, supra note 28, at 1090.
317. See generally, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS, supra note 23.
318. See, e.g., Peter Passell, Disputed New Rolefor Polls: Putting a Price Tag on
Nature, N.Y. TIvm, Sept. 6, 1993, at 1. col. 1 (describing the use of opinion
surveys to perform "contingent value studies" in order to value environmental
degradation); Note, "Ask a Silly Question . . .": Contingent Valuation of Natural

Resource Damages, 105 HARv. L. REV. 1981 (1992). For some of the economics
literature, see ROBERT C.MITCHELL & RICHARD T. CARSON, USING SURVEYS TO VALUE
PUBLIC GOODS:

THE CONTINGENT VALUATION METHOD 65 (1989); ENVIRONMENTAL

ECONOMICS: A READER 81-112 (Anil Markandaya & Julie Richardson eds., 1992).
319. See supratext accompanying notes 299-304.
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analysis predictability is subsumed within accuracy. One component of accuracy-of determining the most stable allocation of
Jurisdictional competencies-is determining how to make these
allocations predictable. Other components of accuracy may be
subsumed within stability, as discussed above. These factors
should be traded against one another in order to minimize transaction costs and achieve efficient allocation of authority. The
optimum tradeoff between these factors may be defined as accuracy.
D. Achieving Accuracy: Courts Versus Legislatures
Brilmayer finds that her work in this regard is by necessity
"ian effort to recommend institutions, not particular solutions."3 20
The immense complexity of the problem of conflict of laws
indicates that it probably is not optimal to specify discrete rules
on a general basis. Thus, the best approach is to devise
institutions capable of determining when and how to
particularize. It will be useful, however, under certain circum3 21
stances, to develop particular solutions.
Having developed a theoretical definition of accuracy in
conflict of laws, it is necessary to proceed to seek to understand
how accuracy might be achieved. The analysis sketched above
requires that various types of effects be valued and compared
with other types of effects. The valuation decisions would have
significant political ramifications, but this fact does not lead to
the conclusion that courts are Inappropriate fora, despite the
criticisms often leveled at conflict of laws approaches that require
3 22
courts to value and balance factors.
As noted by Baxter, courts are the default option. 3 23 If the
legislature or other body fails to instruct them on how to decide
conflict of laws, it is left to courts to devise a method for decision.
Therefore, from a practical standpoint, until the complete
resolution by the political branches of conflicts issues, courts
must stand ready to decide conflicts cases.3 2 4 In addition to this
passive role, however, courts may have three active roles.

320. FOUNDATIONS, supra note 47, at 149.
321. See infra text accompanying notes 322-28.

322. See, e.g., Laker Airways v. Sabena, Belgian World Airlines, 731 F.2d 909,
948-52 (D.C. Cir. 1984). In Laker Airways, Judge Wilkey argued that courts are
unable to apply the Jurisdictional balancing test contemplated in the Restatement
(Third). See RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 76, § 403.
323. See supra text accompanying note 193.

324. See Alfred Hill, The JudicialFunction In Choice of Law, 85 CoLuM. L. REV.
1585 (1985).
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First, courts can play a role in developing conflicts law, by
experimenting with approaches to reciprocity and comity. In this
sense, one might view comity as a kind of "meta-law" that may

precede the development of legislation or treaties which might fix
more discrete rules. While, as Brilmayer argues, 3 25 reciprocity
may be a weak approach because it lacks clear standards and
allows defection, it might be useful as an initial approach to
explore the possibilities for multilateralism. Reciprocity and
comity, to the extent exercised by courts, may be viewed as a
somewhat mystified, sub-political approach used to muddle
through on issues that are not yet suitable for political resolution.
These issues of overlapping scope of governmental authority are
extremely difficult and have been ignored in, and belie, our public
international law system of territorial sovereignty.3 26 Until one
can overcome the presumptions of this system, comity and
reciprocity may be appropriate responses.
Second, courts may help goad legislatures into action.
Nouveau depegage is proposed soberly and it may be the most
accurate-albeit Solomonic-approach in many cases. However,
its very Solomonic aspect, if implemented by courts, might goad
legislatures into action. When legislatures have not acted, but
should and can, perhaps it is best for courts not to seek to fill the
3 27
gaps, but merely to embrace and address complexity.

Third, as this Article illustrates, conflicts issues are often
complex and particular. Until one is able to develop a legislated
or agreed system for addressing the complexity and particularity,
courts and the common law system have the flexibility and the
ability to address complexity to the degree necessary to handle

325. See supra text accompanying note 257.
326. In De Conflictu Legum Dlversarum In Dlversls Imperils, Ulrich Huber
developed a three-part logic that has defined the territorial approach: states are
sovereign; each state has exclusive territorial jurisdiction; and no state may apply
its laws in the territory of another. See D.J. Llewelyn Davies, The Influence of
Huber's De Conflictu Legum on English Private International Law, 18 BRiT. Y.B.
INT'L L. 49, 57 (1937); Friedrich K. Juenger, A Page of History, 35 MERCER L. REv.
419, 434-35 (1984). See also The Apollon, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 362, 370 (1824), in
which Justice Story wrote that "[tihe laws of no nation can justly extend beyond
its own territories, except so far as regards its own citizens. They can have no
force to control the sovereignty or rights of any other nation, within its own
jurisdiction." Id.
327. See, e.g., E.E.O.C. v. Arabian American Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244 (1991)

(applying a presumption of territoriality, and thereby challenging Congress to
speak clearly to the issue of extraterritoriality in worker discrimination law, which
challenge Congress took up); Zoelsch v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 824 F.2d 27 (D.C.
Cir. 1987) (Judge Bork declining to apply United States securities law where

Congress had not made clear its desire to do so).
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these types of cases. Once a legislated or agreed system is
established to address conflicts in a particular doctrinal area, it is
likely to be incomplete, in the sense that it will contain issues for
courts to analyze and address. 3 28 One would expect any regime
developed by the political branches to delegate at least some issues, such as those relating to the assessment and balancing of
facts, to courts or to regulatory agencies.
Obviously, when it is possible through interstate negotiation
or legislation to develop a formula for resolving conflicts in
advance, for application by courts or other bodies, this should be
done.
In some cases, the transaction costs involved in
negotiation, or in developing formulae, may be greater than can
be justified by the additional legitimacy and predictability that
agreed or legislated formulas may provide. In these cases, there
remains an important role for courts.

V.

CONCLUSION

The question remains of what law to apply in connection with
a Dystopian harmed by a United States-manufactured
automobile, when the automobile complies with all Dystopian
standards.
If the conflict of laws issue could be clarified,
Dystopians would know in advance what protection they have,
and United States auto manufacturers would know in advance
the standard of care to which they will be held. This clarity would
allow each side to negotiate (either by voice or by exit) for a
different standard, should the applicable one be unacceptable.
This clarity would delineate the distribution of responsibility
between the United States and Dystoplan governments and
thereby discipline them to provide their respective constituents
with an appropriate level of protection and responsibility for their
respective societies and for the area in which their societies

Intersect.
As courts, legislators, or interstate negotiators seek to resolve
conflicts issues, they should recognize what accuracy means: the
ability to empower communities to determine their own destinies.
This simple goal entails great complexity in realization. Once the
full complexity is accepted, it is appropriate to simplify it: to
develop mechanisms that allow optimal tradeoffs between
accuracy,
on the one hand, and predictability and
administrability, on the other.

328. See supranote 17.

1994)

CONFLICT OF LAWS

1057

The proposal made here merely provides a methodology designed to inform discourse, adjudication, legislation, and interThe
governmental negotiation regarding conflicts issues.
proposal would welcome discrete rules such as those posited by
the vested rights approach, provided those rules succeed in
minimizing transaction costs through an optimal combination of
accuracy and predictability or administrability. Alternatively, it
would accept balancing tests informed by this approach, if they
meet the same requirements. This seeming inconsistency in
accepting both of these alternatives may be consistent when
viewed from a broader perspective. It is necessary to examine
specific components of specific doctrinal areas to determine what
works in those areas. Of course, transaction costs might be
diminished if there is a degree of uniformity, or at least coherence, across doctrinal areas and their components. It is also
necessary to examine specific types of institutions, in order to
determine how most efficiently to respond to conflicts questions.

